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The Unitary Executive Theory in Comparative 
Context 
DAVID M. DRIESEN† 
The debate over the unitary executive theory—the theory that the President should have sole 
control over the executive branch of government—has proven extremely parochial. Supporters of 
the theory argue that the original intent of our country’s founders requires presidential control, 
including a power to remove federal officials from their posts for political reasons. Opponents of 
the theory rely on functional considerations and our practice of dispersing power more widely. 
But neither side examines developments abroad to see what light other countries’ experience 
might shed on the question of whether the Supreme Court should craft a new rule of constitutional 
law cementing presidential control over the executive branch of government. This Article 
examines that experience, primarily through case studies of recent democratic decline in 
Hungary, Poland, and Turkey.  
It shows that centralization of head-of-state control over the executive branch of government 
provides a pathway to autocracy. Indeed, unilateral presidential control of the executive branch 
constitutes a defining characteristic of autocracy.  
In all of these countries, authoritarian leaders secured legislation or constitutional amendments 
establishing effective head-of-state control over key bureaucracies that usually enjoy substantial 
independence in a well-functioning democracy, such as the prosecution service, the electoral 
commission, and the media authority. Autocrats use this power to shield their supporters from 
prosecution while persecuting political opponents, to tilt the electoral playing field in favor of the 
ruling party, and to shrink the public space for debate; thus, severely impairing democracy and 
the rule of law.  
Realization that the unitary executive paves the way for autocracy reframes the unitary executive 
debate. We must ask whether the Supreme Court should establish a practice by judicial fiat that 
authoritarians established through legislation and constitutional amendment. This Article 
explains that our tradition favors a construction of the Constitution that reduces the risk of losing 
our democracy and urges rejection of the unitary executive theory.  
 
 † University Professor, Syracuse University, Syracuse University College of Law, 950 Irving Ave., 
Syracuse, NY 13244-6070; driesen@law.syr.edu. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The debate over the unitary executive theory—the theory that the President 
must have sole control over the executive branch of government—has been 
extremely parochial.1 Unitary executive theory proponents (unitarians) claim 
that the original intent of the Constitution’s Framers and Ratifiers (collectively, 
the Founders) justifies the theory.2 Most of the theory’s opponents make 
functional claims, describing an American constitutional custom of distributed 
authority and suggesting that this practice fosters a desirable dialogue between 
experts at various government agencies and the President.3 Yet, contemporary 
scholars do not generally discuss experience abroad in debating the unitary 
executive theory.4 This Article draws on comparative constitutional law to 
inform the debate about the unitary executive theory. 
It turns out that heads of state working to substitute autocracy for 
constitutional democracy obtain centralized control over key government 
agencies, such as the prosecution service. This centralized control enables them 
to protect corrupt regime supporters, persecute political opponents, tilt the 
electoral playing field, and shrink the public space for debate and opposition.5 
The experience of autocrats undermining democratic government strongly 
suggests that creating a unitary executive paves the way for autocracy. A 
despotic President who obtains sole control over the executive branch of 
government will likely use his authority to entrench himself in power and 
undermine democracy and the rule of law upon which it depends.  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court embraced the unitary executive theory, 
with some exceptions, in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection 
 
 1. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural 
Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1158 (1992) (noting that “unitary executive theorists” claim that the 
President must have “direct control” over all executive officers); cf. id. at 1166 (discussing some differences in 
the nature of the required control among supporters of the theory). 
 2. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 
YALE L.J. 541, 550 (1994) (stating that the Constitution’s text and history support the unitary executive theory); 
see also Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and the President’s 
Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 991–94 (1993) (arguing that the Framers’ intent supports the unitary 
executive theory); cf. STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 37–38 (2008) (arguing that the history of presidential support for the 
unitary executive theory over time supports it). 
 3. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Foreword, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative 
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 759 (2007) [hereinafter Strauss, Overseer] (arguing that the President oversees 
government agencies, but that the Constitution does not require the President to have the power to decide all 
issues himself); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation of Powers Questions—A 
Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 492 (1987) [hereinafter Strauss, Formal and Functional] 
(suggesting a functional approach to deciding separation of powers questions affecting administrative agencies); 
Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 
COLUM. L. REV. 573, 581 (1984) [hereinafter Strauss, Place of Agencies] (assuming that useful analysis must 
largely accept existing reality). 
 4. Cf. M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 603, 651, 653 n.125 (2001) (describing fragmentation of power within branches of government as “our 
assurance against threatening concentrations of government power”). 
 5. See generally Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 
78 (2018). 
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Bureau.6 The Seila Law Court struck down a for-cause removal provision 
preserving the independence of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB), on the ground that the President has a constitutional right to fire its 
director for political reasons.7 But Seila Law, a 5-4 decision, stands in 
considerable tension with earlier cases.8 The Court should consider the capacity 
of a unitary executive to unravel democracy in future cases as it reconciles its 
holding in Seila Law with prior cases less hospitable to the unitary executive 
theory. Indeed, this Article’s analysis suggests that the Court should consider 
overruling Seila Law in light of the potential danger its extreme unitary 
executive theory poses to democracy and the rule of law. 
In spite of the lack of recent domestic legal scholarship considering 
whether head-of-state control over the executive branch catalyzes autocracy, the 
idea that unchecked presidential control over the executive branch of 
government endangers democracy and the rule of law in the long run is not new 
to the American constitutional law tradition.9 The founders of this country 
appreciated that danger and denied the President sole control over the executive 
branch of government based on their study of experience abroad and their desire 
to preserve a republic, providing a congressional role in both the appointment 
and removal of executive branch officials.10 Furthermore, some of our most 
esteemed statesman and Supreme Court Justices—such as Alexander Hamilton, 
Joseph Story, Daniel Webster, and Louis Brandeis—recognized the danger 
complete presidential control over the executive branch poses to democracy.11  
Yet, the contemporary debate on the unitary executive theory pays little 
heed to this ancient wisdom and contemporary experience, exhibiting the 
parochialism that characterizes much of American constitutional law in recent 
years. Neither the majority nor the dissent in Seila Law address the lessons of 
comparative constitutional law for the unitary executive theory. In the United 
States, unlike in most constitutional law courts, the practice of considering 
experience of other countries in constitutional adjudication has proven 
controversial.12 A devout originalist may reject consideration of any recent 
 
 6. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2211 (2020). 
 7. Id. at 2197–98. 
 8. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659–60 (1988) (upholding a statute making a counsel 
investigating high level wrongdoing independent of presidential control except in the case of breaches of duty); 
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935) (upholding the independence of the Federal 
Trade Commission). 
 9. Kathryn E. Kovacs, Rules About Rulemaking and the Rise of the Unitary Executive, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 
515, 516 (2018) (stating that “presidential administration is morphing into autocracy”). 
 10. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670–75 (holding that the Appointments Clause authorizes vesting the power 
to appoint an independent counsel in the judiciary and quoting the Appointments Clause, which requires Senate 
approval of principal officers); id. at 723 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the Constitution authorizes 
Senate removal after impeachment); see also Sharon B. Jacobs, The Statutory Separation of Powers, 129 YALE 
L.J. 378, 389 (2019) (discussing George Washington’s concern that a “chief” of a faction could inaugurate 
“permanent despotism”). 
 11. See infra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. 
 12. Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: 
Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 752 
(2005) (discussing the debate). I do not mean to imply that the Supreme Court constitutes a constitutional court 
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experience, especially foreign experience, as inappropriate.13 In other words, 
originalists may believe that constitutional interpretation requires the rejection 
of all experience and wisdom, save that captured in the statements of our 
Constitution’s Framers. 
This parochialism, however, proves ironic, for the Framers extensively 
studied experience abroad before drafting the Constitution.14 Nor is learning 
lessons from other countries foreign to our separation of powers jurisprudence. 
As recently as the Youngstown decision in 1952, the Supreme Court extensively 
considered the experience of democracy loss (in Nazi Germany) in reaching a 
judgment about the scope of presidential power.15 In other words, our tradition 
does not require that contestable originalist claims defeat all wisdom and 
subsequent experience.  
Furthermore, the Framers did articulate concerns about where sole 
presidential control over the executive branch could lead based on their study of 
history.16 And they assured anxious citizens deciding whether to ratify the 
Constitution that they had not left the executive branch completely separated 
from control by Congress. Instead of adopting a pure system of separation of 
powers, Alexander Hamilton explained, they hedged their bets by introducing 
numerous checks on presidential power.17 
This Article presents the background debate on the unitary executive 
theory, evaluates the experience from democracy loss abroad, and then explains 
how an appropriate response to this experience can safeguard our democracy, in 
spite of the Court’s misstep in Seila Law. The first Part presents the background. 
It explains the unitary executive theory and discusses its reception in the 
Supreme Court and the executive branch. It then turns to the scholarly debate on 
the unitary executive theory, showing that previous work has often focused on 
formalist claims based on constitutional text and history or upon practice and 
general functional considerations, rather than upon the role of centralized power 
over the executive branch in undermining the rule of law and democracy abroad. 
It establishes that the Founders sought to craft a Constitution immune from 
democratic backsliding. It argues that this intent, which united the Framers’ 
views with those who made the Framers’ proposal into an enacted charter of 
government by ratifying the Constitution, creates a principle of constitutional 
construction, which should influence how a Court resolves the more specific 
 
in a strict sense. But it shares with the constitutional courts a leading role in the adjudication of constitutional 
claims. 
 13. Id. at 885 (noting that the Court rarely refers to foreign law cases “where the decision . . . depends 
primarily on an interpretation of the original meaning” or in structural constitutional law cases). 
 14. See WILLIAM R. EVERDELL, THE END OF KINGS: A HISTORY OF REPUBLICS AND REPUBLICANS 150–70 
(2d ed. 2000). 
 15. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593, 649–51 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (Jackson, J., concurring) (explaining that the “experience through which the world has passed” in 
Nazi Germany shows the need to construe the Constitution to maintain checks and balances). 
 16. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining that the Constitution places 
“every practicable obstacle” in place to combat foreign influence upon and corruption of the President). 
 17. See infra note 140 and accompanying text. 
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debates over the unitary executive theory. The Court should construe the 
Constitution to preserve democracy and the rule of law. 
The next Part analyzes the role that centralized administration plays in 
undermining the rule of law and democracy. It explains that democracies 
generally rely heavily upon a civil service insulated from political interference, 
formally independent agencies, and a tradition of limiting centralized control 
over prosecution and other government decisions in order to establish a rule of 
law. It shows, using case studies of democratic erosion in Hungary, Turkey, and 
Poland, that autocrats seeking to subvert democratic governments secure 
constitutional changes restructuring the executive branch to facilitate centralized 
control over key bureaucracies. It then describes how this centralization 
substantially impairs the rule of law by defeating the principle that the law 
applies equally to all. Once an autocrat establishes control over prosecution and 
administration, the autocrat’s minions apply the law vigorously to regime 
opponents, while giving corrupt supporters of the autocratic regime a free pass. 
This politically skewed application converts laws designed to achieve legitimate 
public policy goals into a pretext for repressing opposition and empowering 
regime supporters. The defeat of the rule of law impairs fair elections and tilts 
the media space toward the ruling regime, thereby undermining democracy. All 
of this implies that a unitary executive poses a threat to constitutional 
democracy’s survival. 
The final Part analyzes the implications of the realization that a unitary 
executive provides a pathway to autocracy. It considers the possibility that even 
with the opening up of a path to autocracy, an autocratic American President 
may not go down that path because of external constraints. It argues that Senate 
tolerance of an autocratic President probably provides a sufficient condition for 
autocracy to greatly undermine the rule of law and imperil democracy, an 
argument anticipated by the Anti-Federalists at the Founding. It explains why 
the lessons from democracy loss abroad suggest that judicial enforcement of 
constitutional rights does not provide an adequate check on a President able to 
command prosecutors and other civil servants to do his bidding. The experience 
abroad and a sound combination of political science and constitutional theory 
also show that political remedies likely will fail to protect a country from 
autocracy when partisan division makes the danger most acute.  
This final Part continues by analyzing Seila Law’s likely effect on 
autocracy’s long term prospects in the United States. It argues that the Court 
should keep its older precedent rejecting the unitary executive theory intact, 
including precedent that accepts statutory provisions that only provide for 
removal of executive branch officials for cause. The Court should therefore 
narrowly construe or overrule Seila Law. It shows, in particular, that for-cause 
removal authority suffices to allow the President to perform the role of taking 
care that the law be faithfully executed, and that the Constitution therefore does 
not clearly require at-will removal authority. Therefore, the Court should allow 
the Congress some latitude to decide whether for-cause or at-will removal 
authority should govern under the Horizontal Sweeping Clause, which 
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authorizes Congress to structure the executive branch of government, as the 
Seila Law dissent argued.18  
The final Part also analyzes several less direct potential implications of the 
Seila Law Court’s embrace of the unitary executive theory—namely rejection of 
the possibility of presidential obstruction of justice and sharp limitation of 
congressional authority over subpoenas. It argues that Seila Law makes 
subpoena authority and acceptance of the possibility of presidential obstruction 
of justice even more important to democracy preservation than they have been 
in the past, even as that case diminishes the likelihood of executive branch 
prosecution of obstruction of justice claims against the President. Each of these 
issues merits its own article, so the analysis of these specific matters remains 
suggestive and limited. Still, this Article explains that the Court should take the 
role head-of-state power over the executive branch plays in establishing 
autocracies into account, and that doing so has important ramifications.  
I.  THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY 
This Part begins with a description and analysis of the unitary executive 
theory and the Supreme Court cases addressing it. It then explains that even 
before Seila Law, the executive branch practice had moved toward a unitary 
model. It canvasses the recent scholarly debate on the unitary executive theory, 
showing that original intent and United States constitutional custom have 
dominated the debate, with no attention paid to experience abroad. On the other 
hand, it shows that both the Founders and Supreme Court Justices have paid 
attention to experience abroad in the past. Finally, this Part argues that the 
Founders aimed to create a Constitution to preserve a republic through a rule of 
law and that the Supreme Court should construe the Constitution to further that 
aim. 
A.  THE SUPREME COURT AND THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson provides the most succinct 
and cogent judicial articulation of the unitary executive theory.19 The Morrison 
majority upheld provisions of the Ethics in Government Act (Act)20 creating an 
independent counsel to investigate and prosecute high ranking officials’ 
crimes.21 In order to prevent presidential interference with independent counsel 
investigation and prosecution, Congress lodged the authority to appoint an 
independent counsel in the judiciary and only authorized the Attorney General 
 
 18. See William Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President 
and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of “the Sweeping Clause”, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 
788, 793–94 (1975) (arguing that the Horizontal Sweeping Clause authorizes Congress to imply presidential 
powers); see also Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2227  (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
Justice Kagan concurred in the judgment on severability and dissented on the relevant issue of for cause removal. 
 19. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 20. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–99 (1982) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–99 (2018)). 
 21. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 659–60. 
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to remove him for “good cause.”22 While the Supreme Court upheld the Act’s 
removal and appointment provisions and rejected the unitary executive theory,23 
Justice Scalia dissented on the grounds that these provisions interfered with 
presidential control over the executive branch of government.24 
Justice Scalia’s dissent relies on the proposition that the President 
possesses “all executive” power under the Constitution.25 This proposition, 
Scalia argued, stems from the Vesting Clause, Article II, § 1, cl. 1, which 
provides, “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States,” without using the word “all” found in describing Congress’ legislative 
power in Article I.26 Since the statute “deprive[s] the President . . . of exclusive 
control over the exercise” of a “purely executive power” (namely prosecution), 
argued Scalia, it conflicts with the Framers’ decision to give the President “all” 
executive power.27 This statement treats the Vesting Clause’s grant of 
“executive power” as a grant of “exclusive control,” thereby implying that the 
President does not share control of the executive branch with Congress or other 
federal officials.  
Justice Scalia equated control with the power to appoint and remove 
executive branch officials.28 For Scalia, the President’s ability, through the 
Attorney General, to remove the Prosecutor “for cause” does not suffice; the 
President must have the ability to remove without cause.29 He strongly suggested 
that presidential control implies rejection of “an attitude of independence against 
the” President’s “will” among officers of the executive branch of government in 
favor of a system where all hold their office only if their conduct pleases the 
President.30 In other words, he equated control over the executive branch of 
government with the power to fire all of those carrying out executive duties for 
any reason or no reason whatsoever. Likewise, Justice Scalia found the inability 
of the President, through the Attorney General, to exercise control over the 
appointment of the independent counsel inconsistent with presidential control 
over the executive branch.31  
 
 22. Id. at 660–64 (majority opinion) (describing these provisions in detail). 
 23. Id. at 670–97. 
 24. Id. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 25. Id. (describing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 as lodging “all of the executive power [in the President]”). 
 26. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1). But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting “all” legislative 
authority in Congress). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 726 (“[T]he constitutional principle that the President had to be the repository of all executive 
power . . . necessarily means that he must be able to discharge those who do not perform executive functions 
according to his liking.”). 
 29. See id. at 706–07 (explaining why good cause removal does not amount to complete control). 
 30. Scalia implies this through his argument that “good cause” removal provisions limit the removal power. 
See id. at 706–07. He points out that a person who can only be removed for good cause does not serve at the 
President’s pleasure. Id. at 707. Indeed, the purpose of a good cause removal provision is to allow the person 
protected by it to “maintain an attitude of independence against the latter’s will.” Id. (quoting Humphrey’s 
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)). By rejecting good cause removal, Scalia implicitly rejects 
executive branch independence from presidential will. 
 31. See id. at 701–03, 707 (criticizing the appointment provisions because they “severely confine” the 
Attorney General’s ability to refuse appointment of an independent counsel). Justice Scalia also emphasizes the 
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I shall refer to the idea that presidential control over the executive branch 
implies presidential control over appointment and removal as the “patronage 
state theory.”32 While this term highlights the possibility that presidential control 
can be used to advance a faction’s interest, a chief concern of the Framers, I do 
not mean to deny that Presidents can use their power to serve rule of law values 
instead. The patronage state theory constitutes a central element of the larger 
theory of the unitary executive.33  
Justice Scalia justified this control, in part, by endorsing a presidential 
prerogative to make political decisions about prosecution. Justice Scalia 
described prosecutorial discretion as involving a balance of “legal, practical, and 
political” considerations.34 Prosecutors must balance these factors, wrote Scalia, 
in deciding whether to prosecute “technical violation[s]” at all.35 He then 
claimed that the Constitution lodges control over prosecutorial discretion, 
including decisions about when not to prosecute violations, in the President.36 
Moreover, Justice Scalia envisioned an executive branch “attuned to the interests 
and the policies of the Presidency.”37  
I will refer to this idea that the President must have exclusive control over 
the politics of executive branch decision-making as the unitary executive 
theory’s “political dimension.” The political dimension implies that a President 
could choose which law violators to prosecute based on political considerations. 
Accepting the unitary executive theory’s political dimension allows the 
President to refrain from prosecuting his supporters’ illegal conduct, while 
unleashing the government’s full prosecutorial wrath upon his opponents. More 
 
separation of powers principle that each department must have “defense . . . commensurate to the danger of 
attack.” Id. at 704. Justice Scalia applies this principle to the executive branch, which he sees as under attack in 
Morrison. See id. at 703 (criticizing the statute for commencing investigations without the assent of the 
“President or his authorized subordinates”). He identifies the constitutional need to defend the executive branch 
as giving “comprehensible content to the Appointments Clause.” Id. at 704. And this content leads him to reject 
the majority’s decision to uphold judicial appointment of the independent counsel. See id. at 713. 
 32. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151 (1926) (explaining that Congressional opposition to a 
custom of presidential removal arose in response to the “use of patronage for political purposes”); HAROLD H. 
BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 408–09 (2006) 
(describing President Jackson’s introduction of the policy of wholesale removal of holdover appointees as an 
innovation justified as serving democracy that soon “degenerated into a ‘spoils system’ of patronage and 
cronyism”); cf. John Yoo, Jefferson and Executive Power, 88 B.U. L. REV. 421, 425–26 (2008) (citing President 
Jefferson’s introduction of the spoils system—the practice of rewarding supporters with offices in the 
government—as an effort to assert personal presidential control over “all law enforcement”). 
 33. See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 2, at 4 (characterizing presidential claims of removal power as 
decisive evidence that Presidents “have believed in the theory of the unitary executive”). 
 34. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 708 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (describing the balancing of these 
factors as “the very essence of prosecutorial discretion”). 
 35. Id. at 707–08. 
 36. Id. (stating that taking control of this balancing from the President “remove[s] the core of the 
prosecutorial function” from “Presidential control”); accord Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., 528 
U.S. 167, 209–10 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the President’s duty to faithfully execute the 
law requires him to be able to decide to refrain from prosecuting violators of environmental statutes). But see 
Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. 
REV. 1559, 1594–95 (2007) (explaining that nonenforcement of statutes can undermine the rule of law). 
 37. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 712. 
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broadly, this political dimension empowers the President to exercise more power 
than is strictly necessary to ensure faithful execution of the law.38 In a situation 
in which an executive branch official must choose between two actions, both of 
which comply with the law, the “political dimension” insists that the sitting 
President’s political preference becomes the determining factor in making the 
decision.39 More troubling, the President and loyal subordinates may support 
policies in considerable tension with the goals of the law they should administer. 
The political dimension—the idea that the President’s personal preferences must 
govern administration—can lead to opportunistic construction of the law, which 
can distort it.40 
The unitary executive theory’s political dimension lies at the heart of the 
unitary executive theory’s tendency to undermine the rule of law.41 While 
unitarians do not endorse perversion of statutes or consider selective prosecution 
for political purposes, the political dimension of the unitary executive theory can 
significantly undermine the rule of law.  
Prior to Seila Law, however, the Supreme Court had not accepted the 
unitary executive theory. The Morrison majority held that the statutory provision 
allowing the Attorney General to remove the independent counsel “for cause” 
provides for sufficient presidential control over prosecution under the 
Constitution.42 It recognized that a “for-cause” removal provision suffices to 
ensure the rule of law.43 An ability of the President through the Attorney General 
to use for-cause removal authority to fire a special prosecutor who commits 
abuses of office by persecuting the innocent, exonerating the guilty, extorting 
money from the accused, and the like suffices to allow the President to “take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed.”44 The majority’s holding, however, 
rejects the political dimension of the unitary executive theory, at least 
implicitly.45 It does not accept the notion that the President’s political 
 
 38. See 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 624 (1841) (recognizing that an officer honestly exercising discretion within 
statutory bounds faithfully executes law); cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (requiring the President to “take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed”). 
 39. Prakash, supra note 2, at 992 (opining that whenever a statute grants an executive branch official 
discretion, the Constitution authorizes the President to “control that discretion”). 
 40. Accord EDWARD CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1957, 80–81 (4th ed. 2008) 
(opining that allowing the President to substitute his own judgment for that of any agency would convert all law 
enforcement questions into discretionary questions controlled by “an independent and legally uncontrollable 
branch of the government”). 
 41. See Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Developmental 
Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2070, 2077 (2009) (the unitary executive theory 
“discounts . . . objective . . . administration . . . and advances . . . an administration run in strict accordance with 
the President’s priorities”). 
 42. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691–92 (holding that the for-cause removal provision does not strip the 
President of all means of removing the officer). 
 43. See id. at 692 (discussing that the for-cause removal provision provides “ample” authority to secure 
“‘faithful execution’ of the laws”). 
 44. See id. (noting that the removal provision does allow removal for misconduct). 
 45. See id. at 695–96 (finding the lack of complete presidential control over the independent counsel 
acceptable because of the for-cause removal provision and the requirement that the independent counsel 
generally follow Justice Department policy). 
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preferences must control decisions about whom to investigate or prosecute under 
the Constitution.46  
The Morrison majority also considered the independent counsel an inferior 
officer and therefore upheld the statute’s provision providing for judicial 
appointment of an independent counsel.47 It justified this characterization by 
noting the narrowness of the independent counsel’s responsibilities.48 Scalia, 
however, in keeping with his view that Article II requires strict hierarchical 
presidential control over the executive functions of government, would have 
interpreted the term inferior officer as only including those subject to direction 
by a superior.49  
The Morrison decision rejecting subordination of prosecution to 
presidential politics comports with our early history and long-standing traditions 
of prosecutorial independence. In the early days, Congress relied heavily on state 
officials and private parties to enforce federal law.50 The Judiciary Act of 1789 
authorized the President to appoint a U.S. Attorney in each judicial district to 
enforce federal law, but in practice they acted quite independently and the 
Judiciary Act did not explicitly authorize presidential removal.51  
We also have a constitutional custom of generally insulating prosecutorial 
decisions from political influence.52 While the President always appointed the 
Attorney General with the advice and consent of the Senate, that official in the 
early days merely advised the President and defended the United States in the 
Supreme Court, leaving prosecution to the independent district attorneys.53 In 
1891, when Congress expanded the Attorney General’s power by creating the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), the President lacked the power to remove the 
Attorney General, the District Attorneys, and other high ranking DOJ officials 
because the Tenure of Office Act prohibited their removal without the Senate’s 
consent.54  
Scalia’s advocacy of the political dimension of the unitary executive 
theory, however, had some precedential support even before Seila Law, albeit 
only in dicta. He drew upon former President and Supreme Court Justice Taft’s 
 
 46. See id. at 692 (finding that the President’s ability to have the Attorney General remove an independent 
counsel who fails to perform his duties suffices to allow the President to ensure faithful execution of the laws). 
 47. See id. at 671–77 (holding that independent counsel is an inferior officer and therefore that the literal 
language of the Constitution authorizes her appointment by the judiciary). 
 48. See id. at 671–72 (referring to the independent counsel’s “limited duties” and “limited . . . jurisdiction” 
as justifications for characterizing her as an inferior officer). 
 49. See id. at 719–21 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining an inferior officer as a “subordinate” officer). 
 50. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Creation of the Department of Justice: Professionalization Without 
Civil Rights or Civil Service, 66 STAN. L. REV. 121, 128–29 (2014) (characterizing the early system of law 
enforcement as “incredibly” decentralized in part because of its reliance of state and private enforcement). 
 51. See id. at 129–30. 
 52. See id. at 170–71 (explaining that the DOJ Act contributed to fostering norms of independence sought 
by its drafters over the long term). 
 53. See id. at 129 (setting out the Attorney General’s limited statutory duties and stating that the Attorney 
General “exercised no control” over the district attorneys). 
 54. See id. at 164. 
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opinion for the Court in Myers v. United States.55 Myers held that Congress 
could not condition presidential removal of an executive officer upon the 
consent of the Senate.56 In dicta, former President Taft suggested not only that 
the Senate could not control the removal decision, but also that Congress must 
permit the President to remove Officers of the United States at will, thus 
endorsing the political dimension of the unitary executive theory.57 Justice Taft, 
however, limited the effect of this position by stating that Congress could protect 
officials not appointed by the Senate from politically motivated removal by 
statutory provisions only permitting removal for cause.58 Otherwise, Taft 
recognized, his position would doom the civil service law that Congress had 
enacted a few decades earlier to defeat the patronage system, under which 
political support for the President (often in the form of a campaign contribution) 
was necessary to gain a post in the federal government.59 Similar civil service 
laws seeking to insulate administration from partisan politics have become a 
hallmark of constitutional democracies around the world.  
Furthermore, Taft affirmed that Congress could expand the class of those 
subject to civil service protections.60 The Myers Court assumed that Congress 
could determine who constituted an inferior officer subject to appointment by 
the judiciary, a head of department, or the President acting alone; and who was 
a principle officer that must be appointed by joint action of the Senate and the 
President. Thus, in spite of the blow Myers delivered to legislative supremacy 
by prohibiting Congress from conditioning removal of Senate confirmed 
officials upon Senate consent, the Myers Court implicitly recognized that 
congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause allowed 
Congress to decide upon the classification of officers.61 The entire Supreme 
Court, however, backed formalist judicial supremacy in Morrison rather than 
deference to Congress, as both the majority and dissent supported judicial 
definitions of inferior officers.62  
The dissenting Justices in Myers read the Constitution as giving Congress 
control over both the term of office and removal, partly based on the belief that 
 
 55. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 723 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that Congress may not 
restrict the “President’s power to remove principal officers” exercising “purely executive powers”) (citing Myers 
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 127 (1926)). 
 56. Myers, 272 U.S. at 176 (holding a statutory restriction preventing the firing of a Postmaster General 
without the Senate’s consent unconstitutional). 
 57. See id. at 127 (stating that the Constitution prevents congressional regulation of removal). 
 58. See id. at 162 (suggesting that Congress may avoid the evil of political removal of inferior officers by 
making sure they are not appointed by the President with the Senate’s consent). 
 59. See id. at 173–74 (affirming that the Senate can continue to combat the “evil of the spoils system” 
through the civil service laws by classifying officers as not requiring Senate approval for their appointment). 
 60. See id. at 174 (stating that by vesting the appointment of officers “in the heads of departments” 
Congress can extend merit system protections to more officers of the United States). 
 61. See id. (affirming that Congress has power to include more officers in the civil service system, without 
explicitly identifying the source of the power). 
 62. Compare Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988) (classifying the independent counsel as an 
inferior officer because he has limited powers and can be removed by the Attorney General), with id. at 719 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (opining that the independent counsel is not an inferior officer because she is not 
subordinate to anybody in the executive branch). 
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a right of removal could become the basis for establishing an autocracy. Justice 
Brandeis saw the Founders’ decision to reject “uncontrollable” presidential 
removal as part of the separation of powers designed “to save the people from 
autocracy.”63 He found the inference of such a power inconsistent with the 
rejection of “customary” monarchial “prerogatives” in Article II and the decision 
to rely on “representative assemblies for the protection of . . . liberties.”64 
Quoting Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, Justice McReynolds opined that 
an “unlimited power of removal” may become an “instrument of the worst 
oppression, and most vindictive vengeance.”65 McReynolds also cited Senator 
Daniel Webster’s concerns that an absolute removal power would turn public 
officers into “sycophants . . . and man-worshippers.”66  
While Taft’s destruction of the Senate’s removal authority would prove 
long-lived, the Court pushed back against the idea of constitutionally required 
at-will removal not long after it handed down Myers. When President Roosevelt 
relied on Myers to remove a Federal Trade Commissioner in order to replace 
him with somebody supportive of the President’s policy views, the Court balked 
and repudiated the Myers dicta requiring at-will removal in Humphrey’s 
Executor v. United States.67 It went on to explain that the Myers dicta could not 
possibly apply to the Federal Trade Commission, because it was carrying out 
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial duties, unlike the Postmaster whose removal 
led to the Myers decision.68 The Humphrey’s Executor Court held that Congress 
could make quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative officers independent from 
presidential control.69 Subsequently, the Court applied Humphrey’s Executor’s 
reasoning to overturn President Eisenhower’s decision to remove a member of 
the War Claims Commission (a quasi-judicial body judging compensation 
claims).70 The Humphrey’s Executor Court, however, suggested that the 
President may retain power to remove “purely executive officers” without 
Senate approval.71 
The Humphrey’s Executor decision also began the work of correcting 
Justice Taft’s misreading of the “decision of 1789.”72 Justice Taft, unable to find 
 
 63. Myers, 272 U.S. at 292–93 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 64. See id. at 293–95; cf. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2228 (2020) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (pointing out that even under the English monarchy “Parliament often restricted the 
King’s power to remove royal officers”). 
 65. Myers, 272 U.S. at 179 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES  § 1533 (1833)). 
 66. Id. (quoting 11 REG. DEB. 469–70 (1835)). 
 67. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States 295 U.S. 602, 618–19, 626 (1935) (disapproving of statements in 
Myers tending to support the idea that for-cause removal protection is improper). 
 68. See id. at 627–28 (explaining that the FTC performs judicial and legislative function unlike the 
executive functions carried out by the postmaster in Myers). 
 69. See id. at 629 (stating that congressional authority to make “quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies” 
independent “of executive control cannot well be doubted”). 
 70. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958). 
 71.  Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 631–32. But see Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 
477, 492 (2015) (reiterating Myers’ erroneous discussion of the “Decision of 1789”). 
 72. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 631. 
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any support for the Myers result in the pre-ratification materials bearing on 
original intent, interpreted a debate among members of the First Congress as 
endorsing the principle that the President alone had the constitutional authority 
to remove officers confirmed by the Senate.73 Legal historians, however, 
consider the debates ambiguous and note a diversity of views among members 
of the First Congress about whether the President enjoys unilateral removal 
authority.74 The Humphrey’s Executor Court noted that the First Congress did 
not make all high officials subject to presidential removal.75  
Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener recognized the constitutionality of 
formally independent agencies, which are set up as non-partisan expert bodies 
insulated from presidential political decisionmaking.76 Democracies around the 
world have adopted the concept of independent agencies. It is common for 
agencies vital to democracy, like electoral commissions and media authorities, 
to be independent agencies.77  
In Seila Law, however, the Supreme Court held that Congress could not 
protect the director of an independent agency not headed by a commission from 
politically motivated removal. More importantly, it partially embraced the 
unitary executive theory articulated in Justice Scalia’s dissent, albeit without 
citing it.78 It created a rule that the President enjoys unrestricted removal 
authority subject to two exceptions.79 First, Congress may offer for-cause 
removal protection for members of “multimember expert agencies that do not 
wield substantial executive power.”80 Second, the Court accepted restrictions on 
 
 73. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (concluding that the congressional decision of 
1789 setting up executive departments adopted a view that the President has power to remove principal officers 
without Senate approval). 
 74. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801, at 36–
41 (1997); Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 211, 233–42 (1989); Edward S. Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power Under the 
Constitution, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 353, 361–64 (1927); Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 
91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1023–1026  (2006); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Indecisions of 1789: Strategic 
Ambiguity and the Imaginary Unitary Executive (Part I) 19–27 (Fordham Legal Stud. Res. Paper, No. 3596966, 
2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3596566. 
 75. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 631. 
 76. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 
89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010); Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and 
Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2013); Jennifer L. Selin, What Makes an Agency Independent?, 
59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971 (2015). 
 77. Daniel Montalvo, Trust in Electoral Commissions, AMERICASBAROMETER INSIGHTS, August, 31, 2009, 
at 1, https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0823en_v2.pdf (discussing the nations that have a democratic 
system of government use independent election commissions to ensure that elections are fair and impartial). 
 78. Compare Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020) (stating that 
“[t]he entire ‘executive Power’ belongs to the President alone” after quoting the Vesting and Take Care Clauses), 
with Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the President possesses 
“all of the executive power” after quoting the Vesting Clause). 
 79. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2198; cf. id. at 2225 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (denying the existence of a general 
rule requiring unrestricted removal). 
 80. Id. at 2199–2200. 
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presidential removal of “inferior officers with limited duties and no 
policymaking or administrative authority.”81 
The Court’s justification for this result, which the dissent and the lower 
courts found inconsistent with Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison, is not 
entirely clear.82 For this Article’s purposes, however, two aspects of the rationale 
loom especially large. First, using strikingly authoritarian language, the Court 
justified its constitutional rule requiring a presidential power to fire people for 
political reasons by stating that executive branch officials “must fear 
and . . . obey” the President.83 Second, the Court justified requiring unlimited 
removal authority over the lone director of an agency as a “structural protection[] 
against the abuse of power . . . critical to preserving liberty.”84 The Seila Law 
Court treats the bureaucrat, not the President, as the threat to liberty that the 
Constitution must guard against.85 
B.  RECENT EXECUTIVE BRANCH PRACTICE 
Even before Seila Law, recent Presidents have pushed to establish a unitary 
executive. In the opinion of Supreme Court Justice (and former Harvard Law 
School Dean and Solicitor General) Elena Kagan, as well as other legal scholars, 
governmental practice now resembles the unitary executive model more closely 
than many had supposed.86 
The trend favoring centralized control of administration arguably began 
under President Reagan. Prior to Reagan, even agencies that Congress had not 
set up as formally independent agencies had a lot of functional independence.87 
President Nixon, for example, had insisted on an independent Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) as a means of ensuring that business elites would not 
capture it.88 Reagan promulgated an executive order that ended most 
government agencies’ independence.89 This order requires a White House 
 
 81. Id. at 2200. 
 82. See id. at 2233–36 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Seila Law LLC, 923 F.3d 
680, 684 (9th Cir. 2019); PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 110 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en 
banc); David M. Driesen, Political Removal and the Plebiscitary Presidency: An Essay on Seila Law LLC v. 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 76 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. (forthcoming 2021). 
 83. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2197 (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986)). 
 84. Id. at 2202 (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986)). 
 85. Id. at 2203 (treating the powerful lone director of the CFPB as an affront to the liberty protected 
principle of divided power and the President as a structural exception to this principle, vindicated by 
extraordinary political accountability). 
 86. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246–47 (2001); Kovacs, 
supra note 9, at 562 (claiming that the unitary executive theory is no longer theory in light of the President’s 
growing power); Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 683, 685–86 (2016). 
 87. See Lisa Manheim & Kathryn A. Watts, Reviewing Presidential Orders, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743, 1766 
(2019) (noting that prior to President Reagan, Presidents “tried to avoid meddling in agencies’ regulatory work”). 
 88. See Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 131–32 (1991) (noting that Nixon endorsed “a strong, 
independent” EPA in spite of some opposition within his cabinet). 
 89. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982); see Mannheim & 
Watts, supra note 87, at 1766 (characterizing Reagan’s order as “set[ting] the stage for greater presidential 
involvement” in regulation). 
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office—the Office of Management and Budget—to review major agency rules.90 
While the order formally relies on the need for cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to 
justify this review, in practice, OIRA reviews rules even in the many cases when 
CBA is not possible and insists on changes for a variety of reasons having little 
to do with CBA (even when a CBA is done).91 One might view the use of CBA 
as an aid to dynamic statutory interpretation conforming statutes to emerging 
elite views about what sensible law does,92 but the DOJ recognized that changing 
law through executive order raises rule of law issues and insisted that the order’s 
instructions only permit changing rules “to the extent permitted by law.”93 
Critics of the order have charged that the order has nonetheless triggered a host 
of illegal actions and it certainly contributed significantly to widespread 
violation of statutory deadlines.94 Thus, it undermined the rule of law in at least 
some respects and moved us closer to having a unitary executive. 
Subsequent Presidents found OIRA oversight of government agencies 
desirable and retained it.95 And Congress endorsed OIRA involvement, to some 
extent, in the Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995.96 The centralization, however, 
has undermined the rule of law even when Presidents more supportive of 
government regulation than Reagan won election. For example, President 
Obama’s administration held up rules required under statutes for political 
reasons, to avoid antagonizing Republican opponents of regulation.97 Thus, 
President Obama undermined the rule of law to enhance presidential influence 
over future policy, subordinating law to politics. 
 
 90. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601(1) (1982). 
 91. David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335, 376–78 (2006) 
(showing that in most cases OIRA review takes place where no CBA has been done and often produces 
significant changes having nothing to do with CBA); Claudia O’Brien, White House Review of Regulations 
Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 8 J. ENV’T L. & LITIG. 51, 73 (1993) (suggesting that industry 
lobbying and OIRA personnel’s personal views influenced its review more than cost-benefit analysis). 
 92. David M. Driesen, Thomas M. Keck & Brandon T. Metroka, Half a Century of Supreme Court Clean 
Air Act Interpretation: Purposivism, Textualism, Dynamism, and Activism, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1781, 
1794–95, 1853 (2018); Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1846–48 (2013). 
 93. See Percival, supra note 88, at 196 (noting that Reagan’s Office of Legal Counsel had insisted that the 
order did not displace the relevant agencies in discharging their statutory functions). 
 94. See, e.g., id. at 175–76 (noting that the Reagan executive order was criticized for displacing agencies 
statutory responsibilities and for lengthy delays); Driesen, supra note 91, at 372–73 (discussing cases where rule 
changes recommended by OMB caused reversal of agency action in court); Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of 
Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under 
Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RES. L. 1, 26–27 (1984) (providing an example of OMB intervention 
causing a statutory violation and suggesting that in general it drives agencies to decisions that illegally rely on 
non-statutory factors). 
 95. Robert V. Percival, Who’s in Charge? Does the President Have Directive Authority over Agency 
Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2487,  2511–13, 2528–39 (2011) (discussing the Obama and 
Clinton executive orders modeled after Reagan’s). 
 96. Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, § 202(a), 109 Stat. 64 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1532 
(1995)). 
 97. Watts, supra note 86, at 699–700 (noting that EPA officials reported being instructed to hold up 
proposed rules to avoid controversy prior to the 2012 election). 
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President Obama’s administration, in keeping with the trend toward 
centralized control, sought to establish his preferred immigration policies 
through a policy of nonenforcement of immigration laws against children living 
here and immigrant parents of American citizens.98 The Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit reversed the policy protecting parents of U.S. citizens as contrary 
to the Immigration and Naturalization Act, and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed 
that decision by an equally divided vote.99 
President Trump built on this legacy to broadly undermine the rule of law. 
He put forward a slate of nominees to cabinet positions more systematically and 
completely dedicated to undermining the laws than any previous President, and, 
with one exception, they sailed through the Senate on lock-step party-line 
votes.100 Trump’s EPA administrator—Scott Pruitt—however, proved so 
corrupt that Trump removed him under pressure.101 Trump more often has 
dismissed or triggered the resignation of officials because they show allegiance 
to the rule of law on matters important to him. For example, Trump fired James 
Comey—who investigated Russian interference in the 2016 election, Jeffrey 
Sessions—who respected conflict of interest rules governing government 
attorneys, and Inspector General Mike Atkinson—who complied with a statute 
requiring him to report whistleblower complaints to Congress.102 He also 
triggered the resignation of Kirstjen Nielsen—who wanted the administration to 
follow immigration law offering asylum to refugees fleeing persecution.103 
Thus, Trump used his appointment and removal authority to undermine the rule 
of law. 
Moreover, President Trump promulgated a set of executive orders that 
attacked the rule of law, including some that sought to substitute presidential for 
legal control over administrative agencies.104 The most sweeping of these orders 
attack much of the United States Code, which tasks administrative agencies with 
 
 98. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146–48 (5th Cir. 2015) (describing this policy), aff’d sub 
nom. 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.). 
 99. See id. at 186 (finding the DAPA policy “manifestly contrary” to the Immigration and Naturalization 
Act). 
 100. David M. Driesen, President Trump’s Executive Orders and the Rule of Law, 87 UMKC L. REV. 489, 
516, 517 n.185 (2019) (noting that then presidential advisor Steve Bannon stated that Trump chose cabinet 
members to “deconstruct the administrative state” and that they had backgrounds of opposing the laws they were 
supposed to administer). 
 101. Richard L. Revesz, Institutional Pathologies in the Regulatory State: What Scott Pruitt Taught Us 
About Regulatory Policy, 34 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 211, 212 nn.1–4 (2019) (explaining that Scott Pruitt 
resigned “after months of controversy and investigations into alleged ethics violations”). 
 102. Peter Baker, Katie Benner & Michael D. Shear, Jeffrey Sessions Is Forced Out as Attorney General as 
Trump Installs Loyalist, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/us/politics/ 
sessions-resigns.html; Charlie Savage, Inspector General Fired by Trump Urges Whistle-Blowers “To Bravely 
Speak Up”, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/us/politics/michael-atkinson-
inspector-general-fired.html; Michael D. Shear & Matt Apuzzo, F.B.I. Director James Comey Is Fired by Trump, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/us/politics/james-comey-fired-fbi.html. 
 103. Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Maggie Haberman, Michael D. Shear & Eric Schmitt, Kirstjen Nielsen Resigns 
as Trump’s Homeland Security Secretary, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/04/07/us/politics/kirstjen-nielsen-dhs-resigns.html (explaining that the resignation stemmed from Trump’s 
demand that she close the border to asylum seekers, which she found “inappropriate”). 
 104. See Driesen, supra note 100, at 497–509 (discussing relevant executive orders). 
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protecting the public from various kinds of harm, such as financial chicanery, 
pollution, occupational hazards, and unsafe products (for example, food, drugs, 
and automobiles).105 Trump, in effect, commanded the agencies to faithlessly 
execute the law by not protecting people from harms, telling them instead to 
protect the businesses they regulate from any net cost.106 He did this by issuing 
an executive order instructing all agencies to repeal two rules for every new one 
promulgated and to ensure that all the rules changed together impose no net 
cost.107 President Trump also instructed the government to undermine the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA), directing federal officials to “waive, defer, grant 
exemptions from, or delay the implementation” of the ACA’s requirements.108 
Notwithstanding the “to the extent permitted by law” caveats (maximum extent 
in the ACA context), these orders instruct government agencies to substitute 
Trump’s policies for the law’s policies.109 
These and other orders substantially undermined the rule of law in much 
of the federal government. In their wake, the Trump administration lost an 
astonishing 91% of its regulatory cases between the beginning of his 
administration and June 25, 2020.110 These cases involve violations of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, which requires legal and reasonable decision-
making and use of procedures permitting public input.111 Normally, the 
government wins about 70% of regulatory cases.112 Judicial reversal only 
produces remand; it does not secure proper enforcement of regulatory statutes.113  
President Trump also incentivized the exodus of about 17,000 civil 
servants.114 He triggered this exodus by freezing pay, leaving vacancies unfilled, 
creating a work environment hostile to rational discussion of policy, and shutting 
 
 105. See id. at 507. 
 106. Id. at 507–08. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 508–09 (quoting Exec. Order No. 13,765, 3 C.F.R. 260 (2018)). 
 109. See Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (invalidating decision to allow Arkansas to 
impose work requirements on recipients of Medicaid under the Act’s waiver authority); New York v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Lab., 363 F. Supp. 3d 109, 141 (D.D.C. 2019) (holding that the Trump Administration’s exemption of many 
employer sponsored health plans from ACA regulation effectuates an “end run” around the ACA as directed by 
the executive order); California v. Health & Hum. Servs., 351 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1284 (9th Cir. 2019) (enjoining 
rule creating exemptions to the ACA’s contraception mandate), aff’d sub nom. California v. U.S. Dep’t of Health 
& Hum. Servs., 941 F.3d 410 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub nom. Dep’t of Health & 
Hum. Servs. V. California, No. 19-1038, 2020 WL 3865243 (U.S. July 9, 2020) (mem.). 
 110. See Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Federal Courts, INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY,  N.Y.U., 
https://policyintegrity.org/trump-court-roundup (last visited Nov. 23, 2020). 
 111. Revesz, supra note 101, at 213 (Trump’s losses stem from failure “to take required procedural steps, 
such as” adequately “explaining its reasoning or allowing for public comment”). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See Baez-Sanchez v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1033, 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 2020) (discussing a rare case of outright 
defiance of a remand order but noting that even after a remand the government may follow its contrary policy 
in another case). 
 114. Lisa Rein, Robert Costa & Danielle Paquette, Shutdown Gives Some Trump Advisers What They’ve 
Long Wanted: Smaller Government, SEATTLE TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/nation-
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down the federal government.115 I am not aware of any studies examining 
whether these moves, which some small government advocates support, have 
contributed to the decline of the rule of law. Legislative decisions to repeal 
regulatory statutes or abolish government agencies, while distressing to liberals, 
conform to the rule of law. Disabling the law by securing the resignation of 
people dedicated to carrying out laws remaining on the books harms the rule of 
law. And a President operating under a unitary executive theory can, over time, 
replace all officials inclined to follow the laws with quislings dedicated to 
carrying out his orders, at least with the connivance of a loyal Senate.116 
C.  THE ACADEMIC DEBATE 
The academic debate has focused mainly on the original intent of the 
Founders and on domestic constitutional custom, not on experience with loss of 
democracy before or after the Founding. This review of the debate will focus on 
a few key elements of original intent and administrative practice, as an 
exhaustive review of all the arguments involved would require a separate article. 
Academic supporters of the unitary executive theory, many of them former 
Scalia clerks, have elaborated and defended Scalia’s claims. Steven Calabresi 
and Saikrishna Prakash have argued that the Constitution creates a “hierarchical 
executive branch” under presidential control administering all federal laws.117 
They derive this proposition from the existence of three separate branches of 
government and the combination of the Vesting Clause—which grants the 
President executive power—and the Take Care Clause—requiring the President 
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Thus, they rely on a structural 
and textual argument about original intent. 
The structural argument warmly embraces separation of powers at the 
expense of checks and balances.118 Calabresi and Prakash argue that the 
Constitution puts the executive branch under presidential control, just as it places 
legislation under the control of Congress and the judicial branch under the 
control of the courts.119 But the Constitution’s text plainly refutes the notion that 
the entities at the head of the various branches of government enjoy exclusive 
control over their branches’ operation. Congress has complete control over 
which courts other than the Supreme Court shall exist, and almost limitless 
 
 115. See id. 
 116. Cf. Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 523 (2014) (noting that the purpose of 
Senatorial confirmation was to prevent appointment based on presidential “favoritism” leading to appointment 
of “unfit” nominees personally attached to the President). 
 117. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 2, at 549–50 (claiming that the historical evidence overwhelmingly 
supports their textualist case for “a hierarchical executive branch under the control of the President”). 
 118. See generally Strauss, Place of Agencies, supra note 3, at 577–78 (contrasting separation of powers 
with checks and balances). 
 119. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 2, at 544, 566 (advocating a “‘high school civics’ conception” of 
separation of powers where Congress controls the legislative power, the judiciary controls the judicial power, 
and the President alone controls the “executive power”). 
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control over the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.120 While Congress has 
legislative authority, so does the President, as he can veto legislation.121 
The Constitution does not leave the executive branch unchecked by other 
branches of government under the Constitution either. The text pointedly denies 
the President sole control over either appointment or removal of officers of the 
executive branch. 
The Appointments Clause does not allow him to appoint a single cabinet 
member without the Senate’s approval.122 It allows Congress to remove “Inferior 
Officers” from presidential control, by expressly authorizing Congress to assign 
their appointment to the judicial branch.123 This strongly suggests the lack of a 
strict hierarchy of control. The Appointments Clause also permits Congress to 
vest appointment power for inferior offices in the head of a department or the 
President.124 But the choice of whether to provide for presidential control or 
influence over the appointment of inferior officers generally lies with 
Congress.125 
The Constitution contains only one Removal Clause—the clause 
authorizing the Senate to remove federal officials upon impeachment by the 
House.126 And that Clause empowers Congress to remove officials of the federal 
government from office, not the President. Thus, no express constitutional 
authority supports the idea of any presidential authority for removal, although 
the custom has certainly evolved since the Founding, even before Myers.127 
Alexander Hamilton explained in the Federalist Papers that the 
Constitution provides for “stability of the administration” because the Senate’s 
approval would be required in order to remove an executive officer.128 It is not 
entirely clear whether Hamilton’s insistence that the President lacks the power 
to remove federal officials unilaterally relies on the exclusivity of the 
Constitution’s Removal Clause or the principle that the power of removal goes 
with the power of appointment (which the Senate shares). But Hamilton 
defended the Constitution’s denial of unilateral presidential control over 
 
 120. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2 cl. 2; Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 513 (1868) (noting that the 
Constitution expressly grants the Congress power to limit the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction). But cf. 
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146 (1871) (holding that Congress may not promulgate a rule deciding cases 
pending before the Court). 
 121. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438–39 (1988) (describing the provision authorizing 
a veto). 
 122. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 673–77 (1988) (recognizing that Article II expressly authorizes 
Congress to choose whether to lodge appointment of an inferior officer in the judiciary, but suggesting that 
separation of powers principles may occasionally limit this power). 
 126. Accord id. at 723 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that the only express provision in the 
Constitution authorizing removal of an executive officer is the clause authorizing the Senate to remove an officer 
upon impeachment). 
 127. Cf. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2225 (2020) (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(ignoring the Senate’s removal authority in cases of impeachment and stating that “nothing” in the constitutional 
text “speaks of removal”). 
 128. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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executive branch officials as promoting a stable rule of law, rather than a rule of 
presidential personality: 
A change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion so 
violent or so general a revolution in the officers of the government as 
might be expected, if he were the sole disposer of offices. Where a 
man in any station had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for 
it, a new President would be restrained from attempting a change in 
favor of a person more agreeable to him, by the apprehension that a 
discountenance of the Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring 
some degree of discredit upon himself.129 
The endorsement of retaining competent officers and the rejection of 
replacing them with new politically aligned officials reflects the disinterested 
leadership thinking at the founding—the widely held view that all objective, 
reasonable officials would agree upon the proper course of action.130 And the 
reference to the President as the “Chief Magistrate,” a locution found throughout 
the Federalist Papers, suggests that the Framers viewed the President’s role as a 
more modest one than the dramatic role he plays today.131 They sought to avoid 
autocracy by establishing a rule of law rooted in a set of duties, checks, and 
balances.132 
The requirement of a congressional role in removal also reinforces the 
values Hamilton articulated with respect to the reasons that the Constitution 
denies the President sole control over appointments. As Hamilton put it, the 
Senate’s advice and consent role discourages the President from nominating 
candidates “personally allied to him, or . . . possessing the necessary 
insignificance and pliancy to render them the obsequious instruments of his 
pleasure.”133 This statement suggests that the Framers did not envision or 
support an attitude of compliance with presidential will, thereby casting doubt 
on the political dimension of the unitary executive theory and the supposition 
that the Constitution embraces fear-based presidential domination, as suggested 
by the Seila Law Court. 
Hamilton’s statements rejecting unilateral presidential removal authority 
appeared in the Federalist Papers, written to influence those considering 
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 130. See GLENN A. PHELPS, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 81 (1993) 
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subscribe); GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A HISTORY 165 (2002) (discussing the Framers’ 
“vision of disinterested leadership”); David M. Driesen, Toward a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78 
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 131. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 18, 66, 68–74, 77 (Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 39, 47, 48 (James Madison), 
NOS. 3–4 (John Jay). 
 132. See Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 579 (2014) (Scalia J., concurring) (noting that 
the Founders viewed the Senate’s role in appointments as a “critical protection against despotism” (citing Freytag 
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 133. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton); Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd., 573 U.S. at 523 (majority 
opinion) (citing Alexander Hamilton’s statements that Senate approval provides a “check upon a spirit of 
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ratification of the Constitution. Since original intent properly focuses on the 
intent of “We the People” who adopted the Constitution, Framers’ statements 
that likely informed the Ratifiers’ decision merit special respect.134 
The political dimension of the unitary executive theory smuggles 
twentieth-century notions of presidential political power into an eighteenth-
century document seeking to create a magistrate.135 We now look at the 
President as the leader of a political party establishing a policy program for the 
entire federal government.136 This reflects not original intent, but the 
proliferation of broad delegation of quasi-legislative authority to the executive 
branch, the rising political force of the presidency because of mass 
communication, the emergence of the United States as a world power, and the 
President’s role as leader of a political party.137 The Framers, far from seeking 
to empower the President to implement his party’s policy preferences, sought to 
avoid the creation of “factions.”138 They viewed the Chief Magistrate’s role as 
one of faithfully superintending efforts to carry out policies reflecting the 
preferences of Congress, not the political preferences of the “chief magistrate,” 
even though they understood that administration of law requires exercise of 
some discretion. 
The originalist argument for the unitary executive theory also must grapple 
with the Framers’ rejection of Alexander Hamilton’s unitarian proposal at the 
Philadelphia Convention. He and other proponents of executive power proposed 
that the President have the power to appoint all executive officers “at pleasure,” 
meaning that the President could both appoint them and remove them at will.139 
The Framers rejected this proposal in favor of the “skillfully contrived” (in 
Hamilton’s words) checks and balances now found in the Constitution’s 
Appointment and Removal Clauses.140 They did this because many of the 
 
 134. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 2, at 552 (stating that originalism properly focuses on the 
constitutional text as “understood by the people who enacted or ratified” it (emphasis added)). 
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 136. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
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Founders feared that sole presidential control over the executive branch would 
lead to monarchy.141 
Edward Corwin pointed out decades ago that the New York Constitution 
contained Take Care and Vesting Clauses precisely mirroring the U.S. 
Constitution’s clauses, but did not allow the Governor to either appoint or 
remove officers, vesting those functions in a council.142 Several scholars have 
also pointed out that the Oath Clause requires executive branch officials to swear 
an oath to obey the Constitution, reflecting the Framers’ conscious decision to 
reject the European tradition of swearing allegiance to the head of state.143 As a 
result, all federal officials must disobey illegal presidential orders, even if they 
reflect the President’s will.144 Scholars have argued that reading the Vesting and 
Take Care Clauses as giving the President sole control over the executive branch 
of government does not provide a plausible reading of the whole Constitution’s 
text in light of the Appointments Clause, the Removal Clause, the Oath Clause, 
and numerous other clauses.145 Justice Jackson made a similar point in 
Youngstown, when he explained that a broad construction of the Vesting Clause 
as embracing royal prerogative was incompatible with the need to have explicit 
constitutional clauses granting the President the right to commission members 
of the armed forces and to get opinions from the heads of executive 
departments.146 
While a few scholars have engaged the unitarians on their own originalist 
terms, most of the theory’s opponents have not. Instead, most opponents have 
argued that whatever the original understanding, constitutional practice has from 
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the beginning to the present day involved a variety of power-sharing 
arrangements with respect to administration, including quasi-private 
corporations, independent prosecutors, independent agencies, a merit-based 
civil service, and the like.147 They suggest that these arrangements serve the rule 
of law well by creating forces tending to foster legal compliance and a dialogue 
between experts and elected politicians about wise policy.148 
D.  THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSTRUING THE CONSTITUTION TO PRESERVE THE 
REPUBLIC 
The foregoing material establishes, at least, that the available information 
does not make an overwhelming originalist case for the unitary executive theory, 
which may help explain why Seila Law produced a 5-4 decision.149 While the 
unitary executive theory offers a fairly natural construction of the Vesting and 
Take Care Clauses in isolation, it stands in considerable tension with many other 
provisions in the Constitution, statements of the Framers that likely influenced 
many of the Constitution’s ratifiers, and the history of the Constitution’s 
drafting. Nor is it an inevitable construction of the Vesting and Take Care 
Clauses, as New York’s Constitution demonstrates. The Constitution does not 
require the President to execute the law faithfully, but only to “take care” that it 
be faithfully executed.150 The “take care” locution suggests not exercise of 
unbridled authority, but rather an effort to get others who implement the law to 
do so properly.151 The passive voice in the Clause (“be faithfully executed”) 
indicates that people other than the President would often execute the law, 
because even in George Washington’s time, presidential execution of all law by 
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the President personally was impossible, and it certainly is impossible now.152 
Justice Roberts acknowledged this point in his Seila Law majority opinion.153 
Reading the web of compromises embedded in the Constitution as embodying 
an unstated agreement on something as fine-grained as for-cause removal seems 
quite problematic, as the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention barely agreed 
on a Constitution at all, and it scarcely survived the ratification process partly 
out of anxiety about presidential power.154 
But some features of the original understanding germane to the unitary 
executive theory are not controversial. The Framers sought to establish a “rule 
of law.”155 While the idea of the “rule of law” has become an integral part of our 
understanding of democracy, its precise contours excite controversy. Still, our 
history does flesh out its basic contours. The rule of law means that the whims 
of a single person do not determine the course of government action. The 
Declaration of Independence complains about arbitrary executive action, 
including the King’s tendency to protect his friends and harshly punish his 
opponents (a characteristic of centralized autocratic government highlighted in 
the next part).156 As Julian Mortensen exhaustively demonstrates, the 
Constitution gives the President executive powers in order to execute laws 
passed by Congress.157 Thus, the rule of law contains the principle of legislative 
supremacy, expressed in the Constitution with the long list of congressional 
powers in Article I, section 8.158 
A rule of law, however, envisions more than just a set of rules that might 
provide a source of power for an autocrat. China and Russia have laws, but 
almost no one thinks that they have a rule of law.159 The rule of law means that 
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law limits not just the ruled, but also the rulers.160 Hence, the Constitution aims 
to make the President and the rest of the executive branch servants of the policies 
Congress enacts into law.161 The idea of faithfulness in the Take Care Clause 
connotes faith to somebody or something outside oneself.162 Thus, faithful 
execution of the law means execution faithful to the policy decisions of the 
enacting Congress.163 This ideal of the rule of law lies behind the stability 
referenced in Hamilton’s statements in the Federalist period and the Framers’ 
hatred of faction. For laws enacted by Congress might remain in place for a long 
time and faithfulness to the Constitution would mean that each successive 
President would seek to realize the law’s objectives, whether the “Chief 
Magistrate” agrees with them or not.164 
The rule of law also implies equal treatment under the law. The law applies 
to all, regardless of their political views or identity.165 If the government only 
enforces the law against its opponents, no rule of law exists.166 While the 
purpose animating the law appears to govern, law applied only to regime 
opponents simply masks arbitrary authority. While the precise scope and 
operation of equal treatment under the law changes over time and is open to 
debate, the existence of the basic principle constitutes an essential element of 
the rule of law. 
Finally, the rule of law implies limits on government power to protect 
individual liberty, an idea expressed in our bill of rights.167 While all western 
democracies protect a set of individual rights, the precise scope and nature of the 
rights protected varies across polities. 
The rule of law constitutes an essential component of democracy under our 
Constitution and the constitutions of subsequent democracies. The People elect 
legislators to enact the laws governing the society, and these elected officials 
must use their judgment about what laws work best, subjecting themselves to 
periodic elections so that the People may remove legislators who oppose needed 
laws or support improvident legislation. The People also elect the President 
because the proper superintendence of the law constitutes an important function, 
and faithless execution can lead to tyranny. 
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This last point proves crucial. The Founders of this country could barely 
agree on the specifics of a Constitution. But they all agreed that they wanted to 
create a republic with the means of surviving the challenges that might destroy 
it. The Framers had studied the demise of previous republics and strove to 
prevent a repeat.168 And they recognized the danger of “despotism,” that the head 
of state might one day threaten the republic’s survival.169 
The intent to preserve the republic from the dangers of despotism should 
guide construction of the scope of presidential power today.170 It constitutes not 
just an institutional arrangement that the Founders barely agreed upon, but an 
essential widely agreed purpose of the entire process of framing and then 
ratifying our Constitution.171 
Youngstown provides support for this mode of constitutional construction, 
as it animates many of the Justices’ opinions.172 Justice Douglas’ concurring 
opinion quotes the Brandeis dissent from Myers, which advocated construing 
the Constitution to “save the people from autocracy.”173 The same passage links 
this republic preservation principle to construction that 
“preclude[s] . . . arbitrary power” even at the expense of executive branch 
efficiency.174 The Douglas opinion associates efficient executive power with the 
“reign of ancient kings” and “rule of modern dictators.”175 
Justices Jackson and Frankfurter, who embraced broader views of 
presidential power than Justice Douglas, likewise construed executive power to 
preserve the republic (based on the experience of democracy loss abroad). 
Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion, which scholars often treat as establishing 
the guiding framework for deciding issues of presidential power,176 expressly 
relies on the Framers’ intent to preserve a republic in supporting a construction 
of the Constitution that did not allow the President to seize steel mills in support 
of an ongoing war effort (in Korea). After laying out his influential tripartite 
framework, which made congressional attitude toward asserted presidential 
power important in resolving questions about that power’s scope, he rejected the 
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view that the Vesting Clause grants the President “all the executive powers of 
which the government is capable.”177 He analogized such broad presidential 
power to the executive powers enjoyed by “totalitarian” governments.178 He 
rejected the claim for implied power, even in the face of an emergency, 
explaining that granting the President of Germany emergency powers led to the 
end of the Weimar Republic.179 He then insists that the Constitution must be 
construed to preserve the republic, stating that “emergency powers are consistent 
with free government” only when their control is lodged outside of the executive 
branch.180 
In deciding whether to construe the Constitution to grant the President 
emergency powers, Jackson took into account the possible threat of increased 
presidential power to free government in light of its growth through the time of 
decision. His opinion discusses the rise of presidential power through the 
President’s emergence as a party leader and the growth of the President’s 
authority and prestige owing to the emergence of mass communication.181 It then 
concludes that the country will not “suffer if the Court refuses further to 
aggrandize the presidential office, already so potent and so relatively immune 
from judicial review, at the expense of Congress.”182 And he insisted on 
interpreting the Constitution to limit the President’s power in order to maintain 
the rule of law.183 In the last line of his opinion, he declared it the duty of the 
Court to preserve the rule of law.184 
Justice Frankfurter’s influential concurring opinion in Youngstown 
likewise supports the principle of construing the Constitution to preserve the 
republic in light of history abroad. His opinion begins by affirming that our 
democracy requires a “reign of reason,” which one might contrast with a rule of 
presidential will.185 He then argued that the experience of Nazi Germany affirms 
the Framers’ wisdom in insisting on a system of “checks and balances.”186 He 
rejected the theory that we enjoy “immunities from the hazards of concentrated 
power” and embraced the Founders’ study of “the experience of man” (in other 
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countries), which showed the need for “limitations on the power of governors 
over the governed.”187  
Justice Black’s majority opinion more subtly alludes to the principle of 
republic preservation at the end of his opinion by referencing the “fears of 
power” that lay behind the Founders’ decision to “entrust[] the lawmaking 
power to the Congress alone.”188 Justice Black, however, placed much less 
emphasis on this principle than the concurring Justices, because he saw the 
formal limits on presidential power as making Youngstown a simple case.189 
II.  THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE ABROAD: LESSONS FROM DEMOCRATIC 
EROSION IN TURKEY, HUNGARY, AND POLAND 
This Part offers case studies of democratic erosion in Turkey, Hungary, and 
Poland to illustrate the role that head-of-state control of the executive branch 
plays in undermining the rule of law and democracy. All three of these countries, 
when they enjoyed a constitutional democracy, employed administrative 
arrangements protecting the independence of the civil service, the prosecutorial 
service, and important state agencies vital to maintaining a democracy, such as 
the electoral commissions and media authorities. While precise institutional 
arrangements vary, around the world functioning democracies rely on 
independence for prosecution services and other agencies vital to democracy to 
ensure a robust rule of law.190 
In Turkey, Hungary, and Poland, however, the head-of-state, with the 
backing of his political party, changed the constitutional order by creating 
centralization, functionally similar to that called for by the unitary executive 
theory.191 In all of these cases, and many more, centralized control undermined 
the rule of law and democracy. Indeed, one might define autocracy, at least in 
part, as a regime where the head of state exercises effective political control of 
the administration of law, rather than relying primarily on reasonably 
independent administration. Elections continue to take place, as they do in China 
and Russia, but the authoritarian leader and his party enjoy a vice-grip on 
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national power in Hungary, Turkey, and other autocracies that has become very 
difficult to break.192 
This process takes time. The literature on democratic backsliding 
emphasizes that a process of erosion taking place over a decade or more can 
destroy democracy, just as a sudden coup would.193 While establishing 
centralized control over the executive branch of government plays a crucial role 
in establishing autocracy, the elected autocrats destroying democracy also 
capture courts and rely on party-line lockstep voting to end deliberative 
democracy based on parliamentary compromises.194 While the political factors 
leading to these institutional changes vary, partisan division plays a leading role 
in loss of democracy across many polities and across time.195  
A.  ESTABLISHING CENTRALIZED CONTROL IN TURKEY, HUNGARY, AND 
POLAND 
While all three autocrats undermined independent administration, the most 
radical example of creation of centralized administration undermining the rule 
of law comes from Turkey. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became Turkey’s Prime 
Minister in 2002.196 After a decade of amassing personal power, he obtained a 
constitutional amendment converting Turkey to a presidentialist system and 
became President in 2014.197 In 2017, he secured enactment of Russian-style 
constitutional amendments to entrench himself firmly in control of the 
government, primarily by creating personal power over the executive branch 
through a tainted referendum passed after using emergency powers to suppress 
civil liberties in the wake of a failed 2016 coup attempt against his 
government.198 The amendments give the Turkish President the authority to 
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“unilaterally appoint and remove all cabinet members and heads of all 
administrative agencies,” giving him precisely the power that unitarians most 
clearly advocate.199 The amendments allow him to appoint half of the members 
of the Constitutional Court, the Council of State (Turkey’s highest 
administrative court), the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors, and the 
Higher Education Council.200 They combine these formidable powers with an 
authority to issue executive orders that have the force of law on all “subjects 
necessary to execute the law,” thereby making the unitarians’ view that the 
President can make all executive policy decisions a key part of the Turkish 
Constitution.201  
Erdoğan removed some 135,000 civil servants from their positions during 
a two-year state of emergency following the 2016 coup attempt.202 This attack 
on the civil service accelerated the establishment of presidential control over 
administration, which Erdoğan had pursued diligently for many years prior to 
the coup and solidified with the 2017 referendum. 
Viktor Orbán, who destroyed Hungarian democracy over a decade, 
similarly consolidated power by taking control of prosecution, the bureaucracy 
overseeing the media, the electoral commission, and the taxation authority 
during his decade in power.203 He “removed opposition figures and neutral 
experts from public institutions.”204 To accomplish this, he had his party, Fidesz, 
amend the labor law protecting the civil service, implementing the key reform 
advocated by unitarians—provision for at-will removal of government 
employees.205 With that accomplished, “critics of the Hungarian government” 
began to lose “their jobs at an astonishing rate.”206 
Poland’s Peace and Justice Party (PiS) likewise consolidated its leader’s 
power by giving Poland’s de facto head of state, Jaroslaw Kaczyński, control 
over prosecution, the media regulatory authority, the electoral commission, and 
the taxation authority. Kaczyński also gutted the civil service. Article 153 of 
Poland’s Constitution requires a “professional” civil service to 
“ensure . . . impartial and politically neutral” administration.207 Poland’s 
Constitutional Tribunal has interpreted this provision as requiring statutory 
procedures to prevent any political interference in the civil service and therefore 
required a recruitment process based on objective criteria “free from suspicion 
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of partisan bias.”208 Nevertheless, Kaczyński’s government rammed a civil 
service act enhancing political control of the civil service through Parliament 
shortly after it took office.209 The new civil service act provides for at-will 
removal, exemption of the top posts from an open competitive process, and 
lessening or eliminating requirements for experience.210 This law, in 
combination with others, paved the way for the Kaczyński government to sack 
more than 11,000 civil servants, many of which it regards as “enemies of the 
state.”211 
Kim Lane Scheppele explains that the new autocrats—such as Orbán, 
Kaczyński, and Erdoğan (until recently)—generally avoid gross, massive, and 
violent human rights violations in favor of using economic repression to 
consolidate their power and control opposition.212 The creation of centralized 
control over the executive branch plays a key role in jump-starting this process. 
Firing civil servants in large numbers sends a powerful message that opposing 
the government can imperil one’s livelihood. The Orbán government amplified 
this message by pressuring private firms to fire opponents of the regime, 
primarily by signaling that firms must cast out dissidents to obtain state 
contracts.213 Firing government officials and economic repression create fear, 
which makes it easier to create further impediments to opposing the regime.  
B.  CENTRALIZATION UNDERMINING THE RULE OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 
Bearing in mind that removing public servants from government can pave 
the way for establishing a generalized climate of fear useful for establishing an 
autocracy, the material below focuses on how the leader’s control over the 
prosecutor’s office, the media authority, and the electoral commission advances 
autocracy. This narrow institutional focus facilitates a cogent look at the links 
between the creation of central control of administration and the key substantive 
elements creating an autocracy—impairing the rule of law, reducing electoral 
competition, and shrinking the public space—without the distraction of an 
overly complex discussion of all agencies that might help achieve those 
objectives or help create autocracy through other means.214  
1.  Centralized Prosecution Sidelining Opponents, Shrinking the Public 
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Space, and Undermining the Rule of Law  
These new autocrats, like the old ones, compromise the prosecutors’ 
independence and assert political control over the prosecutor’s office. When this 
happens, prosecutors become useful instruments in undermining the rule of law 
and democracy.  
In Hungary, Orbán secured the resignation of a respected chief public 
prosecutor, possibly by blackmail.215 Orbán then replaced him and his 
subordinates with Fidesz loyalists. Through constitutional amendment, Fidesz 
put itself (and therefore Orbán) in charge of selecting the chief prosecutor, by 
getting rid of the requirement for multiparty support from parliament (a 
requirement of two-thirds approval of Hungary’s unicameral parliament).216 It 
then passed “transitional provisions” giving Orbán’s chief prosecutor the power 
to control case assignments.217 This ensured that an Orbán-approved prosecutor 
could control the exercise of prosecutorial authority in key cases.  
Poland’s leader also subverted the political independence of prosecutors.218 
Legislation passed on January 28, 2016, accomplished this politicization by 
merging the positions of Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General, bringing 
both under the control of Kaczyński’s Minister of Justice, Zbigniew Ziobro (a 
leading politician).219 The new legislation assigns this Minister comprehensive 
power to reassign cases among prosecutors and give orders in specific cases,220  
a striking departure from democratic norms prevailing in western democracies. 
It also breaks down the tradition of walling off prosecution from control of the 
de facto head of state by explicitly allowing the Justice Minister to share 
information with outside parties. This provision legitimized Ziobro’s prior 
practice of consulting with Kaczyński about ongoing investigations and 
prosecutorial decisions.221 
Even before the 2016 military coup, Erdoğan took steps to establish central 
control over prosecution. He began to change the mechanisms for prosecutorial 
control through a 2010 constitutional amendment (approved in a referendum) 
restructuring the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), which 
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appoints and disciplines prosecutors (and judges).222 In order to curtail 
investigation and arrest of Justice and Development Party (AKP) members for 
corruption, including high-ranking government officials, Erdoğan started 
attacking the prosecutors verbally and then brought them under the control of 
the central government beginning in 2013.223 He did this partly by curtailing the 
power of prosecutors to secure police support for investigation independently.224 
Erdoğan then transferred prosecutors (and judges) away from the corruption 
cases and brought the HSYK under the control of political appointees.225 
Erdoğan used the coup to replace career prosecutors with loyalists in huge 
numbers, thus completing the establishment of a key element of presidential 
control.226  
Once the head of state has effective control over prosecution, he can use 
this power to tilt electoral competition. Government prosecutors attack the 
regime’s opponents and protect its supporters. The forms these attacks take vary 
based on national law and culture, but in all cases centralized control over 
administration paves the way for selective prosecution to undermine the rule of 
law and electoral competition.  
In Hungary, Orbán’s prosecutors have used the law as a political weapon 
by charging opposition politicians with corruption.227 The prosecutor’s office 
announces and publicizes prosecution at times calculated to influence 
elections.228 The government usually drops the charges after the election, but 
charging a politician with corruption can end her career. At the same time, 
Fidesz corruption, which is rampant, almost never triggers prosecution.229 
Turkey’s prosecutors sideline the regime’s political opponents with 
different techniques.230 Prior to the coup, they usually charged Erdoğan’s 
opponents with minor crimes unrelated to elections. The prosecution focused on 
laws that many people violate in Turkey, such as tax laws.231 With increasing 
frequency, especially after the coup, they arrest opposing legislators for 
supposedly supporting terrorist groups.232 
Turkey also uses prosecution as a weapon to shrink the public sphere. The 
government arrested 500 defendants in between 2008 and 2011, including some 
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journalists, and charged eighty-six of those arrested with plotting a coup.233 The 
court of appeals, however, dismissed those charges for lack of evidence in 
2016.234 The government sued journalists and other critics for libel.235 The costly 
lawsuits had a chilling effect as journalists self-censored to avoid civil suits, and 
later, criminal prosecution for libel.236 The government also levied a $2.5 billion 
fine against the Dogan Yayin media conglomerate, which forced it to sell off 
important media outlets to groups aligned with the government.237 Since the 
coup, Erdoğan’s government has become the world’s leader in jailing 
journalists, with emergency powers and its grip on the courts facilitating the 
repression of opposition journalism.238 
While Poland has only recently centralized prosecution, already some signs 
indicate that Kaczyński may likewise exploit his control over the public 
prosecutor to shrink the public sphere, as he has begun to use prosecution as a 
weapon against political opponents. The Public Prosecutor launched a criminal 
investigation against Andrez Rzeplinski, the former head of the Constitutional 
Court, for “abuse of power.”239 The alleged “abuse” involved resisting PiS’ court 
packing.240   
Similarly, the Minister of Justice threatened to sue professors and Ph.D. 
students who criticized revisions to the Criminal Code.241 The revisions in 
question protect government officials in control of certain state owned 
companies from corruption prosecution in a law advertised as enhancing 
penalties for corruption.242 The Minister of Justice abandoned this gross invasion 
of free speech quickly, but still, the announcement served as a warning that 
anyone criticizing the regime too effectively risked prosecution.243 Kaczyński’s 
government has brought at least one libel action to silence critical media.244  
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Hence, in Turkey and Hungary establishment of the chief executive’s 
effective control over prosecution undermined the rule of law. It led to selective 
enforcement where law functions not as a set of general principles limiting 
everybody’s conduct, but as a source of power to sideline opponents. The 
regimes use prosecutorial power not to implement a rule of law, but to tilt 
electoral competition in favor of the chief executive and his party and often to 
shrink the space available for criticizing and opposing the government. In 
Poland, recently centralized control of prosecution has not destroyed the rule of 
law as of this writing, but the regime has already signaled its intent to use 
Kaczyński’s enhanced capacity to persecute enemies to punish dissent, in 
keeping with Kaczyński’s declared intent to follow Orbán’s lead.245 
2.  Ending Independent Electoral Commissions to Tilt Elections 
Most successful democracies around the world use independent electoral 
commissions to administer elections. By not allowing a single leader or political 
party to control electoral administration, democracies provide an important 
structural safeguard to ensure free and fair elections.  
Since autocrats want to tilt the electoral playing field, they compromise 
electoral commissions’ independence, allowing the autocrat to control them, 
either directly or indirectly. In Hungary, under the pre-Fidesz system, the 
election commission resembled the United States’ Federal Election Commission 
and the electoral commissions in many U.S. states, in that it contained people 
from more than one political party.246 Each of the five leading parties in 
parliament controlled one seat and the parties filled the remaining seats by 
mutual agreement.247 Fidesz terminated the mandates of members slated to 
remain through 2014 and replaced the members formerly chosen by agreement 
among the parties with its own members.248 This arrangement allowed Fidesz to 
defeat a key mechanism for challenging Orbán’s monopoly on power, a 
referendum. Under Hungarian law, the Electoral Commission must certify 
referenda before placing them on the ballot, and the Fidesz-controlled 
Commission has blocked this avenue of challenging the ruler’s power.249 
Blocking a referendum entrenches the government, as a rebuke of a government 
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through a referendum in Hungary had provided a means of bringing down the 
government.250 
A similar effort to bring the administrative apparatus supervising elections 
and funding political parties under the control of PiS and therefore Kaczyński 
lies at the heart of the Polish government effort to tilt the rules of electoral 
competition.251 Prior to Kaczyński’s ascent, Poland’s National Electoral 
Commission, which supervises Polish elections, consisted of judges, selected by 
fellow judges, an arrangement well designed to prevent a single party from 
rigging elections.252 PiS, citing non-existent “monstrous” irregularities in 
elections that it kept losing, passed a bill giving the Kaczyński-controlled lower 
house of parliament the right to select the vast majority of members of the 
electoral commission.253 The new law also authorizes commissioners indirectly 
controlled by PiS to gerrymander election districts.254  
Turkey also interfered with the independence of its electoral commission, 
the Supreme Board of Elections (SBE) (a group of judges as in Poland) and 
lower level administrative bodies. AKP replaced eight of the SBE’s eleven 
members (placing three in custody) and 221 “lower-level election board 
chairpersons” (placing sixty-seven in custody).255 It also placed over 500 
electoral board staff in custody.256 The AKP-dominated SBE invalidated the 
election of an opposition candidate as mayor of Istanbul in 2019 based on the 
claim that civil servants did not run the elections, a common arrangement in 
Turkey.257 This gambit, however, did not prove successful, as the opposition 
candidate won the rerun by a wider margin.258  
Sometimes, as in Turkey, the autocrats rely upon their control over 
electoral agencies to do almost all of the dirty work.259 In those cases, the chief 
executive’s effective control of the executive branch provides the primary means 
of tilting elections.  
 
 250. Id. at 256 n.31. 
 251. Cf. Richard Albert & Michael Pal, The Democratic Resilience of the Canadian Constitution, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS?, supra note 196, at 117, 127–32 (arguing that Canada’s independent 
electoral commission and other administrative entities have contributed to Canada’s constitutional resilience). 
See generally Bruce A. Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633 (2000). 
 252. See SADURSKI, supra note 191, at 141. 
 253. Id. at 140–41. 
 254. Id. at 141–42; Wojciech Sadurski, Constitutional Crisis in Poland, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
IN CRISIS?, supra note 196, at 257, 260. 
 255. OFF. FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTS. AND HUM. RTS., REPUBLIC OF TURKEY, CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM, 
16 APRIL 2017: FINAL REPORT 2, 7, 8 (2017), https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/2/324816.pdf. 
 256. Id. at 8. 
 257. Carlotta Gall, Turkey Orders New Election for Istanbul Mayor, In Setback for Opposition, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/world/europe/turkey-istanbul-mayor-election.html. 
 258. Carlotta Gall, Turkey’s President Suffers Stinging Defeat in Istanbul Election Redo, N.Y. TIMES (June 
23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/23/world/europe/istanbul-mayor-election-erdogan.html?auth= 
login-google. 
 259. Poland seems poised to follow the Turkish reliance on takeover of electoral commissions to subvert 
democracy. But no election has taken place under the new structure as of this writing. 
38 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:1 
In Hungary, however, legislation played an even larger role than executive 
power.260 The Fidesz-controlled parliament heavily gerrymandered legislative 
districts and passed laws making it hard for ethnic minorities and those fleeing 
the regime to vote, while authorizing and facilitating voting among supportive 
ethnic Hungarians living in countries near Hungary.261 The heavy 
gerrymandering and manipulation of the electorate permitted Fidesz to obtain 
about 69% of the seats in parliament with only about 45% of the vote in 2014.262 
Turkey employed legislative gerrymanders as well.263 
Even when the parliament passed legislation tilting elections, the partisan 
electoral commission made its own contributions to the project of tilting the 
electoral playing field. In Hungary, the partisan Electoral Commission sent out 
confusing information to groups likely to vote against Fidesz while making it 
easy for groups thought supportive of Fidesz to vote.264  
In Turkey, the electoral commission disobeyed Turkish law by accepting 
unstamped ballots in the 2017 referendum establishing authoritarian rule.265 
Interference with civil liberties during the state of emergency also contributed 
to this narrow victory for autocracy.266  
Thus, centralized control over administration regularly contributes to 
tilting the electoral playing field, as electoral commissions brought under the 
political control of the autocrat’s party shape the electorate to tilt electoral 
outcomes in the autocrat’s favor. But legislating unfair electoral rules has also 
played a role, especially in Hungary.  
3.  Supplanting Independent Media Authorities to Shrink the Space for 
Dissent 
Hungary, Poland, and Turkey, like most democratic countries, established 
formally independent media regulators.267 To prevent a single ruler and his party 
from capturing the media authorities, these countries established mechanisms to 
ensure multiparty representation on their media councils.  
The new autocrats’ political parties brought the administrative agencies 
regulating the media under the chief executives’ control after amending the 
media laws to allow their party to select all or most of the councils’ members. 
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Their supporters then used the media authorities to shrink the public space for 
opposition.  
Orbán’s media council levied hefty fines on broadcast media for failing to 
provide “balanced” news coverage to intimidate opposition media.268 The media 
council also fired unsympathetic journalists employed in public broadcasting 
and cancelled long running shows with perspectives at odds with the Orbán 
government.269 The Orbán government allocates digital, terrestrial, cable 
frequencies, and crucial state advertising dollars based on political criteria.270 
All of these measures have created a juggernaut propagating state propaganda.271 
On the other hand, Orbán has interfered with the media council’s 
independence even though Fidesz controls it in order to exert yet greater control 
over the media. In November of 2018, owners of media outlets donated 476 
television and radio stations to a non-profit foundation promoting “Christian and 
national values.”272 When opposition groups challenged the foundation for 
violating national media laws, Orbán defeated the media council’s jurisdiction 
over the foundation.273 By 2019, few media outlets remained independent 
beyond a handful of websites in Budapest.274 
Similarly, Turkey’s AKP-dominated Supreme Council of Radio and 
Television (RTUK) supplemented prosecution of journalists with broader 
attacks on media organizations. That body issued fifty warnings and 112 fines 
against television channels and seven warnings and eleven fines to radio stations 
under very broad laws in 2016 alone.275 In the wake of the failed coup attempt, 
this body closed two dozen television and radio outlets in the same year.276 The 
government also ordered the closure of dozens of newspapers.277 
Turkey has a Directorate General of Press and Information that controls 
press accreditation necessary for access to the Prime Minister and his press 
office.278 In 2015, the government brought this organization firmly under 
Erdoğan’s control by reducing the number of seats held by media representatives 
from more than 50% to a third.279 In the crackdown after the coup, the 
Directorate revoked nearly 800 press cards.280 
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Turkey also centralized procurement at the highest level of the executive 
branch.281 Turkey used this authority over procurement to bring additional 
financial pressures to bear in its drive to suppress dissent and support 
sympathetic media.282 A few large holding companies that earn a majority of 
their revenue in construction, energy, mining, and financial services own most 
of the important private media properties in Turkey. Erdoğan’s government uses 
government procurement and licensing to punish dissent and put important 
media assets in friendly hands. For example, the government determined which 
holding company would purchase the Sabah-ATV media group in exchange for 
a multibillion-dollar airport construction contract.283 It also withholds state 
advertising from critical outlets, pressuring them to fire critical journalists.284 
Purges of journalists insufficiently supportive of Erdoğan through prosecution 
and financial pressures put 10,000 journalists out of work by the end of 2016, 
according to the Turkish Journalists Association.285 
Kaczyński’s centralization of control over media regulation has converted 
public broadcasting into a state tool of propaganda reminiscent of the 
Communist period.286 Although the Constitution vests the formally nonpartisan 
National Council of Radio and Television Broadcasting (Broadcast Council) 
with the authority to appoint public broadcasting managers, PiS passed a “small 
media law” ending the terms of incumbents prematurely and moving the 
appointment authority for managers to the Secretary of the Treasury.287 This 
Kaczyński supporter then replaced the management of public broadcasting with 
strong supporters of the government. These changes led to the replacement of 
some two hundred journalists from public broadcasting with far-right 
journalists.288 While Poland never had a fully independent public broadcasting 
service, the structural changes have effected an extreme capture of public 
broadcasting. Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal held the Small Media Law’s 
provisions consolidating central control over appointment and removal 
unconstitutional under the Constitution’s provisions establishing the Broadcast 
Council’s power over public broadcasting and its mandate to preserve free 
speech and freedom of information.289 This ruling acknowledges that changes in 
structure centralizing control of the executive branch lead to infringements of 
liberty. Kaczyński’s PiS party defied the ruling and passed legislation 
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establishing a Council of National Media in order to supplant the constitutionally 
established independent Broadcast Council.290 President Duda and the PiS 
majority in parliament have appointed the majority of the Council of National 
Media, which now oversees public broadcasting and has authority to continue 
the purge.291  
In a bizarre example of what can happen when an autocrat exercises too 
much control over administration, the Kaczyński government’s politicized 
public television service turned around and filed lawsuits against Polish 
Ombudsman Adam Bodnar and law professor Wojciech Sadurski for accusing 
the service of hate speech in connection with the assassination of the mayor of 
Gdansk.292 Bodnar won his case in court, but as of this writing, some of the suits 
against Sadurski, one of which makes criminal charges, remain pending.293 
Thus, centralized control over the management of public media has led, albeit 
indirectly, to the state broadcasting service becoming an organ working to 
suppress speech. Even unsuccessful prosecution can chill free speech.  
Kaczyński, like Erdoğan and Orbán also had his government use economic 
measures to bolster sympathetic media and discourage criticism.294 Kaczyński’s 
regime cut off public advertising and other income sources from critical media 
outlets, whilst paying for advertising in sympathetic private media outlets.295 
And the Broadcast Council has acted to chill speech by levying a substantial fine 
on a television station for reporting on demonstrations around Parliament.296 
When the television station threatened to go to court, the Broadcast Council 
withdrew the penalty, but the threat sent the message that media outlets that dare 
to cover anti-PiS activity place them themselves at risk.297  
In Hungary and Turkey, elected heads of state established centralized 
control over the executive branch of government and used that control to 
severely erode constitutional democracy by undermining the rule of law, tilting 
the electoral playing field, and shrinking the public space for opposition. Poland 
has asserted similar centralized control recently and has started down the same 
path. Well-functioning democracies do not permit centralized control over the 
entire executive branch of government, but autocracy might well be defined by 
that control. 
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III.  LESSONS FOR AMERICA 
The analysis above suggests that the unitary executive provides a pathway 
to autocracy. It shows that if an elected chief executive with autocratic 
tendencies obtains effective control over the executive branch of government, 
he will likely use that power to erode democracy and the rule of law. This Part 
demonstrates this conclusion’s relevance to American practice and explains why 
the Court should read Seila Law narrowly or, better yet, jettison it entirely, in 
light of the lessons learned about how autocratic heads of state undermine 
democracy.  
A.  THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE PATHWAY TO AUTOCRACY IN AMERICA 
The power to remove government officials and replace them with the chief 
executive’s preferred people provides a powerful weapon to convert the 
government from an instrument of law into the instrument of an autocratic chief 
executive. A President can simply fire conscientious people and seek to replace 
them with quislings willing to do his bidding. Part III’s account implies that the 
chief executive’s practical ability to fire people helps produce autocracy, even if 
his appointment power gives him only informal control over key appointments. 
Effective control by the chief executive matters, not the formal arrangement of 
empowering the chief executive to choose each appointee by himself.  
Comparative constitutional law scholars frequently note that comparative 
study illuminates our own experience.298 We can see, in retrospect, that 
American Presidents have sought to use control over the executive branch to 
subvert the rule of law and even democracy. It would be naive to think that this 
cannot happen again and go further.  
The Watergate scandal demonstrated the utility of at-will presidential 
removal authority in subverting not just the rule of law, but free and fair 
elections. The Watergate story also shows the value of for-cause provisions in 
protecting the rule of law. President Richard Nixon decided to tilt the electoral 
playing field in his favor by trying to get dirt on his opponents, ordering a 
burglary to get documents from the Democratic National Committee housed in 
the Watergate complex and ordering tax audits of his political opponents (a 
possible prelude to using the Turkish tactic of selective prosecution for tax 
violations to sideline opponents).299 In response to evidence of the Watergate 
break-in, Attorney General Elliott Richardson appointed a special counsel to 
investigate.300 President Nixon responded to this threat of uncovering his effort 
to tilt the electoral playing field by forcing the resignation of law-abiding 
subordinates and trying to put more pliant officials in their stead. Nixon ordered 
Attorney General Richardson to fire the special counsel.301 But the Justice 
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Department regulations governing the special counsel office only authorized for-
cause removal, and no cause existed.302 Richardson refused to violate his oath 
of office and resigned in protest.303 Nixon then ordered his successor, William 
Ruckelshaus, to fire the special counsel.304 Ruckelshaus likewise refused and 
resigned.305 President Nixon, however, found an “obsequious instrument[] of his 
pleasure” (in Hamilton’s words) in Ruckelshaus’ successor, Robert Bork, who 
agreed to fire the special counsel.306 Government officials’ allegiance to their 
constitutional duty to not bend to presidential will helped vindicate the rule of 
law. The reaction to the “Saturday Night Massacre”—the forced resignation of 
Richardson and Ruckelshaus—led to increased support for impeachment.307 
And Nixon resigned to avoid almost certain impeachment and removal.308 
The George W. Bush Administration also took steps to centralize 
prosecution in ways that arguably undermined the rule of law to tilt the electoral 
playing field. The Bush Administration encouraged U.S. Attorneys to prosecute 
voting fraud cases and other cases.309 They reviewed these cases but ultimately 
demurred for lack of evidence.310 Bush’s Attorney General, Alberto Gonzalez, 
then fired several well-respected U.S. Attorneys.311 An uproar in Congress, 
however, ensued over this attempt to weaponize prosecution to tilt electoral 
competition, and Gonzalez resigned.312  
Donald Trump has also sought to use prosecution to tilt the electoral 
playing field, by protecting his friends and persecuting his enemies. Trump has 
more broadly encouraged prosecutors not to go after Republicans committing 
crimes, lest the prosecution damage the Republicans’ electoral chances.313 
Conversely, he asked the DOJ to investigate Democratic politicians and other 
“enemies,” including Hillary Clinton, John Kerry, Joe Biden, James Comey, and 
Oakland Mayor Libby Schaaf, while publicly suggesting that his political 
opponents (like James Comey and Hillary Clinton) should go to jail without 
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citing any evidence of a crime.314 When Trump’s efforts to obtain a DOJ 
investigation of Joe Biden produced no public announcement of such an 
investigation, he withheld military aid from Ukraine in order to force Ukraine’s 
government to announce an investigation.315 This abuse of power triggered his 
impeachment, but the Senate acquitted him.316 Trump has also obtained the 
resignation of key cybersecurity officials, thereby inviting Russian interference 
in the 2020 election.317 And Trump exercised authority over the Department of 
Commerce to place a census question about citizenship on the ballot in order to 
tilt elections, although the Supreme Court ultimately checked this abuse of 
power.318 
Trump has brought the Justice Department under firmer central control by 
removing Jeffrey Sessions and appointing William Barr as Attorney General, by 
all accounts a firm believer in the unitary executive theory.319 Barr has acted 
more like an agent of autocracy than like a supporter of prosecutorial 
independence.320 He redacted parts of the Mueller Report on Russian 
Interference in the 2016 Election (“Mueller Report”), announced that the report 
did not show that the President had committed obstruction of justice in advance 
of release of evidence to the contrary, investigated civil servants investigating 
Russian interference in the 2016 election, and instigated a process leading to a 
DOJ request to dismiss charges against Michael Flynn, a Trump aide who had 
pled guilty to charges of lying to the FBI about his Russian contacts.321 Thus, 
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belief in the unitary executive has led to pressures to erode the rule of law by 
discouraging lawful investigation of the President and his minions and go after 
President Trump’s opponents.  
The American experience shows that even our Presidents can seek to erode 
the rule of law in order to entrench themselves in power. A President without an 
executive branch willing to do his bidding, however, cannot establish an 
autocracy. A President with control over our prosecution service and other 
significant government agencies has a chance. If the government officials 
internalize the unitary executive theory and simply obey the President, the rule 
of law can readily perish. The President simply has to order underlings to 
disobey the law or at least apply it selectively. We have rarely seen pervasive 
undermining of the rule of law in the past partly because our civil servants 
customarily follow the law and our constitutional culture supports that custom. 
This culture of fidelity to law, however, comes from a series of political 
decisions embracing internal separation of powers over time, including the 
adoption of the Oath Clause, the creation of a civil services insulated from 
political pressures, the establishment of independent agencies, and our tradition 
of prosecutorial independence established at the Founding.322 But the Court’s 
embrace of the unitary executive theory likely will further erode this custom.  
In principle, an executive branch following the leader’s orders can utterly 
destroy freedom and the rule of law. The executive branch alone has the capacity 
to embarrass people with indictments, arrest them, and imprison them. It alone 
grants broadcast licenses. It disburses government funds and decides whom to 
enforce the law against. Even an agency like the CFPB, if subject to complete 
presidential control, can become a tool to entrench an autocratic President in 
power, prosecuting businesses not kowtowing to the President while allowing 
businesses owned by supporters to abuse consumers. The new authoritarians 
have learned to use economic pressures to subdue opposition, and an American 
President can emulate their tactics.  
The case studies, moreover, teach us that once a President controls the 
executive branch of government, judicial enforcement of the Bill of Rights 
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cannot adequately constrain a clever autocratic President.323 They show that 
techniques exist to evade the courts and to inflict immense damage to the rule of 
law and democracy.  
Orbán avoids judicial review of abuses of prosecutorial authority designed 
to sideline opponents by dropping announced corruption charges after elections 
rather than pursuing them in court. The pre-2016 Turkish government’s model 
of prosecuting political opponents for minor offenses that normally do not 
trigger prosecution also provides a way of avoiding judicial reversal, as the 
courts have no legitimate means of avoiding guilty verdicts based on selective 
prosecution if the evidence justifies conviction. All of these countries fail to 
prosecute corrupt regime supporters, and no judicial check exists on that.324 So, 
a President with the authority to politicize investigations or prosecution, a 
necessary consequence of the political dimension of the unitary executive 
theory, can do enormous damage to the rule of law. In addition, some executive 
branch actions subverting the rule of law can escape judicial review because 
officials carry them out in secret or because of justiciability barriers.  
The point that the judiciary cannot provide an adequate remedy for an 
executive branch under the political control of an unrestrained despot is 
consistent with the Framers’ view that the Ratifiers insistence on a bill of rights 
was superfluous. They thought that checks and balances and separation of 
powers provide more potent security for liberty than a bill of rights, a view 
echoed in Seila Law and other recent cases.325 The unitary executive theory, 
while consistent with separation of powers, dismantles checks and balances. 
The United States, moreover, has less robust checks on executive power 
than Turkey, Hungary, and Poland had prior to their election of authoritarian 
leadership. The constitutions in countries that suffered through Nazi or 
Communist dictatorship usually secure prosecutorial independence either 
through requirements for multiparty support for chief prosecutors or a 
controlling or large role for an independent council (usually of judges) in 
selecting prosecutors. By contrast, the President of the United States can 
nominate political friends to key posts under the United States Constitution. 
Control of the Senate may suffice to provide a President with complete 
control over the executive branch of government sufficient to destroy the rule of 
law and democracy over time. Because the Constitution denied the President 
authority to unilaterally appoint or remove officials, many of the 
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antifederalists—those who opposed ratification of the Constitution without 
additional amendments—did not cite fear of an autocratic President unilaterally 
destroying democracy as a reason to vote against the Constitution (although 
some did). They accepted Hamilton’s argument that restraints of the President’s 
power over the executive branch made him too weak to establish an autocracy 
because that argument fits the constitutional text. Instead, they feared that a 
“cabal” between the President and the Senate would undo the fledgling 
American republic.326 
The Senate, however, might well have the capacity to check an autocratic 
President. It can refuse to approve the appointment of officials unless they 
evince a clear commitment to the rule of law. It can also remove a President if 
the House impeaches a lawless President.  
We cannot assume, however, that those weaker constraints will prove so 
effective as to make a unitary executive safe over time. For one thing, the Senate 
has largely abandoned the role of making sure that key appointees show 
dedication to the rule of law and expertise. Instead, it often operates under the 
principle that the President is entitled to the officials he wants. So, it has in recent 
times approved appointees who clearly aimed to harm the rule of law. 
Furthermore, impeachment requires a two-thirds vote, so that it only operates as 
a constraint when partisan division is mild and dedication to the rule of law 
pervasive among federal politicians. Political scientists, however, have shown 
that autocratic leaders usually take over during times of partisan division, when 
the legislature’s failure to function effectively leads to some support for a 
demagogue.327 To gain election, any President must have the support over at 
least a substantial minority of the population, and Senators have incentives not 
to remove a President with such substantial support from the electorate. Given 
the robust evidence that most voters know shockingly little about politics or 
government, we cannot assume that public support for a President driving 
toward autocracy will diminish substantially because of misconduct, even when 
carried out in broad daylight.328 
Even though a majority of voters may come to recognize an authoritarian 
in the White House, that realization may not necessarily translate into Senate 
action, because a very small minority of voters can elect the Senate. In fact, 
because of disparities in state population sizes, less than 20% of the population 
can create a majority in the Senate (although in practice elections have not 
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realized the theoretically worst outcome).329 Minority control of the Senate has 
accelerated, with the Senate in 2019 having a Republican majority after 57% of 
the electorate voted for Democratic Senatorial candidates in 2018.330 (Since 
Senate terms are staggered, majoritarian outcomes in the Senate might not 
perfectly mirror the results of one year’s elections, but this still suggests 
skewing).  
Structural constitutional deviations from majoritarianism played a role in 
the rise of autocracy in Hungary, Poland, and Turkey. In Turkey, Erdoğan’s 
AKP party obtained a two-thirds majority in Parliament with just 34% of the 
vote in 2002, thanks to a law denying representation to parties winning less than 
10% of the vote. Similarly, Poland’s PiS party obtained a parliamentary majority 
with less than 38% support in an election with low turnout.331  The constitutional 
compromises at the founding of Hungary’s post-Soviet democracy also gave a 
boost to larger parties in order to avoid excessive fragmentation in Parliament. 
That led to Fidesz capturing a two-thirds majority in Hungary’s legislature with 
only 53% of the vote in 2010.332 That supermajority enabled Fidesz to pass 
constitutional amendments (and legislation) transforming the Hungarian system 
to empower Viktor Orbán. Anti-majoritarian features in a Constitution (like the 
electoral college and the Senate) can enable an autocrat to take power without 
majority support or obtain a supermajority with only a bare majority of the 
electorate approving of his party.  
Fully evaluating America’s vulnerability to autocracy would require a 
book, and I have written one that addresses the presidential power threat more 
completely while mentioning many broader vulnerabilities.333 The literature on 
democratic erosion teaches us that many elements work together to facilitate 
democratic decline. Judges considering the matter cannot have clairvoyance 
about the future of American democracy. But the history of the world shows that 
democracies are rare, and many have perished. When a judge writes a new rule 
of constitutional law (even if derived from the judge’s understanding of original 
intent), that creates long-term consequences. If the rule creates a risk for 
democracy, as a rule creating a unitary executive does, that rule would pose a 
long-term risk. In light of the role of sudden shocks, personalities, and hard to 
predict political factors in destroying democracy, the subject would seem to 
demand judicial humility with respect to future predictions.  
But there is little doubt that internal separation of powers—the name 
scholars have given to intra-branch checks and balances—lessens the risk of 
democratic decline, at least slowing it down when a despot gets elected. 
Furthermore, as the Trump impeachment shows, resistance by civil servants able 
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to withstand a despot can play an important role in making political checks on 
autocracy feasible. 
B.  UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY AFTER SEILA LAW 
Seila Law’s endorsement of the unitary executive theory could perform the 
same role as statutes and constitutional amendments played in enabling 
autocracy in Turkey, Poland, and Hungary. In effect, Seila Law amends the 
Constitution, which has permitted many governmental departments to have 
some independence from presidential will since 1789, often quite substantial 
independence, to increase centralization through a new constitutional rule 
written by the Justices. In Turkey, Poland, and Hungary, parliamentary 
majorities (Poland), supermajorities (Hungary), and plebiscites (Turkey) drove 
comparable changes in constitutional principle. 
The experience in these countries suggests that the Seila Law majority’s 
emphasis on bureaucratic threats to individual liberty, while in keeping with 
contemporary conservative politics, does not comport with international 
experience.334 The primary threat to democracy comes from the head of state’s 
unchecked control over government officials. Functioning democracies, by 
contrast, employ checks and balances to ensure the independence of key 
government agencies. Furthermore, Justice Robert’s suggestion that government 
officials must fear the President sounds in authoritarian philosophy, not the 
practice of democratic government.  
The Constitution does not require the Supreme Court to create a 
constitutional rule facilitating autocracy. The Constitution does not specifically 
authorize the Supreme Court to imply fine-grained presidential powers from 
broad clauses not mentioning removal or from principles of separation of powers 
in tension with checks and balances.335 It does, however, authorize Congress to 
regulate removal authority under the Horizontal Sweeping Clause. That Clause 
authorizes Congress to “make all laws . . . necessary and proper for carrying into 
execution . . . all powers vested by this constitution in the government of the 
United States . . . or in any department or officer thereof.”336 The President, of 
course, only exercises power vested in the United States government and is an 
officer of the United States government. Hence, the Court could have held that 
Congress has the right to determine if the President can remove officials without 
reason or instead only for just cause. 
Justice Kagan’s Seila Law dissent argued that wise judgment about 
removal requires political judgment more appropriate to Congress than to a 
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group of unelected judges.337 Seila Law limits congressional ability to take the 
risks of authoritarianism into account in shaping future administration, thereby 
making it hard to learn lessons from authoritarians abroad or President Trump’s 
assault on the rule of law at home.  
The principle that the Court should construe the Constitution to further the 
Framers’ goal of preserving a democratic republic supports a narrow 
construction of Seila Law, at a minimum. Part III demonstrated that media 
authorities and electoral commissions often play a key role in destroying 
democracies. Our Federal Election Commission (FEC) and Federal 
Communication Commission (FCC), as their names suggest, have multi-
member commissions at their heads. The rule established in Seila Law that the 
President must have unlimited authority to remove single directors of an agency 
does not require the President to have the authority to remove the commissioners 
of the U.S. media and electoral authorities at will.338 Seila Law, however, 
contains a dictum confining its previous decisions on independent commissions 
to those that “do not wield substantial executive power.”339 The Court should 
not use that dictum, which is in considerable tension with Humphrey’s Executor, 
to interfere with these commissions’ (or other commissions’) independence.  
Part III also showed that prosecutors can play a large role in undermining 
the rule of law and democracy. Seila Law’s dictum leaves room to secure the 
independence of lower level prosecutors, as it recognizes that the Court has 
approved congressional restrictions on presidential removal for “inferior officers 
with limited duties and no policymaking or administrative authority.”340 In light 
of the Seila Law Court’s emphasis on legislative precedent as a measure of the 
constitutional legitimacy of removal protection, Congress should be able to 
robustly protect the independence of District Attorneys.341 
Seila Law, however, likely prevents Congress from taking an important 
step recommended by Cass Sunstein to protect our democracy and the rule of 
law from a President abusing prosecutorial authority to punish his enemies and 
protect his friends—making the entire Justice Department, including its top 
officials, independent.342 And a President determined to use executive power can 
use almost any government power to reward friends and punish enemies, thereby 
subverting democracy and the rule of law. For these reasons, the Court should 
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consider overruling or sharply limiting Seila Law, which is inconsistent with its 
holdings in Morrison and Humphrey’s Executor.343 
Leaving the decision about whether to give various officials for-cause 
removal authority to Congress would help the Court avoid problematic formalist 
line-drawing. Under Seila Law, the question of whether Congress may protect 
officials from politically motivated and potentially abusive removal depends 
upon difficult to define distinctions between executive authority on the one hand 
and adjudicative and legislative authority on the other with respect to 
commissions or between principle and inferior officers.344 The fact that many 
government agencies exercise several different types of authority makes such 
line-drawing deeply problematic. Indeed, the Court has largely given up policing 
one of the major dangers to democracy—delegation of vast powers to the 
executive branch—on the ground that it cannot distinguish executive from 
legislative authority in order to enforce the constitutional rule prohibiting 
delegation of legislative authority to the executive branch.345 Having permitted 
vast delegations of authority to the executive branch, the Seila Law Court’s new 
limits on the tools Congress may possess to limit presidential abuse of delegated 
authority are deeply problematic.  
C.  FURTHER IMPLICATIONS 
The need to confine the implications of the unitary executive theory in light 
of its propensity to create authoritarian government has more fine-grained 
implications, as the theory has influenced legal practice even before the Supreme 
Court’s recent endorsement of the theory. This final Part suggests possible 
implications for the laws on presidential obstruction of justice and congressional 
authority to subpoena information from the executive branch. 
The analysis in Part II suggests that authoritarian heads of state have a 
tendency to obstruct investigations into their own administration’s conduct. 
Indeed, as the Turkish case study suggests, the desire to shield the head-of-state 
and his supporters from prosecution for misconduct often provides motivation 
for heads of state with authoritarian tendencies to assert control over 
prosecution. This tendency to want to obstruct investigations has played a role 
in impeachment cases in the United States, as the Congress charged Presidents 
Nixon and Trump with obstruction of their investigations.  
The unitary executive theory has an influence over the question of whether 
a President can commit obstruction of justice.346 This issue surfaced during the 
Mueller investigation of Russian interference in the 2016 election and in his 
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report to Congress on that matter. William Barr, then a private citizen who had 
worked at the DOJ, wrote an unsolicited memorandum to his former colleagues 
arguing that the President’s ability to control prosecution makes it inappropriate 
to charge him with obstruction of justice for seeking to have James Comey “let 
go” of the investigation of Michael Flynn and firing Comey when he 
persevered.347 As Attorney General, Barr concluded that President Trump had 
not obstructed justice, despite evidence supporting an obstruction charge in the 
Mueller Report.348 The Mueller Report itself pointedly disagrees with Barr’s 
suggestion that the President cannot commit obstruction of justice.349 
Mueller explained that the President only has the right to honestly direct 
prosecution and investigations; he does not have authority to “corruptly” 
influence investigations and prosecution, which is what the obstruction of justice 
statute proscribes.350 This issue is separable from the question of whether the 
DOJ can indict a sitting President during his term in office. If the President can 
be liable for obstruction of Justice but cannot be prosecuted while in office, he 
could be prosecuted once he leaves office.  
Endorsement of the unitary executive theory might suggest that Barr’s view 
is correct. But Seila Law does not deny that the Constitution aims to create a rule 
of law that constrains corrupt presidential administration, even though its limits 
on Congressional authority to protect the independence of top-level DOJ 
officials may impede investigation of high-level wrongdoing. The entire Seila 
Law Court failed to consider the possibility of presidential abuse of power. 
Accordingly, the courts remain free to reign in presidential obstruction of justice 
in future cases. In the short term, the DOJ and/or Congress should affirm that 
the obstruction of justice statutes apply to the President.  
The Trump Administration also resisted subpoenas, even those issued in 
support of a House impeachment investigation.351 In doing so, it defied statutes 
passed by Congress and signed into law by Presidents for more than 150 years 
and practice dating back to the founding of the republic.352 Unitarians sometimes 
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resist congressional oversight as an inappropriate interference with executive 
branch operations.353  
Because oversight of administrations can yield information pointing to the 
need for fresh legislation curbing abuses or revealing the need for impeachment, 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly authorized Congress to investigate alleged 
executive branch failures to implement the law properly when the inquiry might 
legitimately lead to legislation.354 The Court subsequently recognized that 
Congress has the authority to “probe corruption” and maladministration in the 
executive branch.355  
But the unitarian view of law execution as an exclusive domain of 
presidential power (and the concomitant discounting of checks and balances) 
has begun to lead the Court to narrow congressional oversight authority. In 
Trump v. Mazars, decided less than two weeks after Seila Law, the Court 
departed from prior precedent to narrow congressional power to obtain a 
President’s private financial information, which can help check corruption in 
presidential administration.356 The Court required a rather demanding showing 
of legislative necessity to justify obtaining President Trump’s tax returns and 
other financial information, imposing stricter limits on congressional authority 
than it imposes when the President asserts a valid executive privilege (as I have 
shown elsewhere).357 On the same day, however, the Court refused to grant the 
same sorts of documents “heightened protection” from a local grand jury 
subpoena.358 
The courts should consider the lessons of democratic erosion in applying 
Mazars on remand and in future cases. The rampant corruption found in 
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autocratic regimes and the importance of its public disclosure as a check on 
autocracy suggests that the courts should place a lot of weight on the Mazars 
Court’s rejection of a requirement that Congress show that the financial records 
it seeks are “demonstrably critical” to legislation in order to obtain documents 
and interpret the necessity showing the Court did require in a permissive 
manner.359 By denying Congress a role in safeguarding conscientious employees 
from abusive removal the Court makes the elections and impeachment even 
more important as checks on abuse of presidential power toward autocratic ends 
and the Court should not impede the discovery of maladministration, which can 
lead to discovery of unknown high crimes and misdemeanors or information that 
can inform the electorate.360 Furthermore, the Horizontal Sweeping Clause 
supports the argument that Congress has a legitimate role to play in ensuring 
faithful law execution. While Seila Law declined to give the Horizontal 
Sweeping Clause effect in the removal context, the Supreme Court has already 
held that the Necessary and Proper Clause does protect its subpoena power.361 
CONCLUSION 
The experience indicating that centralized head of state control over the 
executive branch of government provides a pathway to autocracy suggests that 
the Court committed a grave error in Seila Law. In future cases, the Court should 
consider the possibility of abuse of presidential power, not just abusive 
bureaucracy. And it should narrowly construe or overrule Seila Law as a long-
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